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Chapter 1
Introduction
The financial history for the past two decades has seen three heart throbbing
episodes of ebb and flow. From 1998 to 2001, the flourishing information technol-
ogy boosted the equity market of the US and the world to a historic high and then
crashed in a few months. From 2002 to 2008, the real estate bubble developed in the
aftermaths of the previous boost only to bust violently in the end as a banking crisis.
Different in nature from the previous two episodes but similarly intriguing is the ad-
vent of the “high frequency traders”, the population of whom rapidly increased from
2006 to 2009 and revolutionized how financial securities are traded. Interestingly,
financial journalist Michael Lewis published three books to document each of these
three episodes of the financial market, indirectly pointing to the importance to these
seemingly unrelated events.
In reverse chronological order, the three chapters of this PhD thesis explore the
commonality of these three periods of history. In all three episodes, to some extent,
the invisible hand fails to motivate the players to act optimally for the common good
of the society.
In the classical economic framework pioneered by works of Adam Smith, each
agent only needs to optimize her own welfare. But in the end by virtue of the
invisible hand, the resources are allocated in a way that is socially optimal. No
deliberate coordination is required as any agents that deviate will be disciplined by
the market. But during the three episodes mentioned earlier, coordination seemed
to be crucial since market discipline did not always serve to guide the behavior of
the players towards societal optimum. The lack of coordination on other hand, may
lead the players to deviate from such optimum.
In Chapter 2, in the context of trading speed competition, I investigate a simple
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form of miscoordination. In the trading platforms, there are two groups of players
that fulfil complementary functions: market makers and market takers. Within each
group, on the other hand, players compete with each other in trading speed so as to
be the winner in a winner-take-all trade rush. As a result, there are not only mutually
beneficial strategic complementarities between a maker and a taker, but there are also
zero-sum strategic substitutions between any two makers or any two takers. Due to
the lack of coordination, none of the two types of externalities, the complementarities
or the substitution can be fully internalized by individual market participants, hence
the invisible hand can under- or over- allocate resources compared to the social
optimum. In this setup, in particular, any form of coordination is not possible in the
anonymous trading platforms. Thus an arms-race like speed competition is a likely
outcome amongst the makers or amongst the takers. But such speed competition is
not without any cost. In the modern times, trade speed can only be achieved through
expensive investments in information technologies.
In this chapter, I demonstrate that whether the cost outweighs the benefit depends
crucially on how the marginal contribution of trading speed to the gains from trade
changes with trading speed itself. I show theoretically that when it is decreasing, the
market discipline by the technological expenses borne by the traders themselves is not
sufficient to curb the speed competition – the traders would over-invest in speed and
exhibit “arms-race behavior”. In the end of this chapter, I provide a micro-foundation
for this decreasing gain from trade of trading speed, based on the classical Merton
portfolio re-balancing problem.
As shown in Chapter 2, market discipline can already run into difficulty in a
simple setup with strategic substitutions and complementarities. But in most modern
economic relationships, there are still other types of frictions that occur alongside
the strategic substitution. For example, in Chapter 3, I consider the innate conflict
of interest between debt holders and the equity holder. Given limited liability, equity
holders have incentives to engage in “risk shifting”: she would take on excessive risk so
that she’s the one that benefits when the realized outcome is good, but her creditors
are the ones to suffer the downside losses. In the context of commercial banks, the
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market discipline in place to address this conflict of interest is by ways of short-term,
demandable debts. When the creditors sense that the equity holder (represented by
the bank manager due to fiduciary duty under the common law) is engaging in such
a risk shifting strategy, they would withdraw their deposits before the bank asset
maturity date, incurring liquidation costs on the equity buffer, punishing the equity
holder. As a result, ex ante, the equity holder should be discouraged to take on
excessive risks.
This market discipline did not fulfill its function in the period leading up to the
2008 financial crisis. The banks still took on too much risk. Demandable debts were
present in the form of money market instruments. Government guarantees did not
exist for these instruments, as the deposit insurance exists for the retail deposits,
so that the market discipline was not neutralized by the government intervention.
Had market discipline have worked, the runs of the money market funds should have
occurred once the bad news of the sub-prime loans surfaced. But this was not the
case and the runs occurred much later. This led me to question a long-held belief:
why runs did not work as a disciplining device? As a consequence of the discussion
above, this question is very important as if under some circumstances the answer is
no, market discipline by the short-term debt holders loses its incentive compatibility
premise and foundation under those circumstances.
In Chapter 3, I show theoretically that the answer is indeed no sometimes. In
particular, higher risk taken by the bank may in fact discourage runs when the bank
equity buffer is low. I demonstrate that this is a result of a common fact in finance:
the higher the asset risk, the higher also is the asset upside payoff. The short term
debt holder, known as “depositors” in this chapter, effectively becomes the residual
claimant of the asset at its maturity. Thus a higher asset risk means the asset would
pay more when it succeeds, which benefits the depositors if they do not run and hold
their deposits until maturity. This occurs only when equity buffer is low, because in
this case, it is more likely that the bank would be insolvent in the end, which is the
circumstance under which the depositors become effective residual claimants. This
mechanism is particularly relevant for banks issuing runnable deposits, as I show
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that runs are able to decrease the equity level, creating the necessary condition of
the effect mentioned earlier. This theory explains well the risk management practice
of counting high payoff assets as substitutes for capital amongst commercial banks.
In Chapter 3, I assume that the manager represents wholeheartedly the best
interest of the equity holders. But because of agency problems, this is hardly the
case in most corporations. Managers (CEOs) may strive to maximize their own
welfare instead of that of the shareholders or simply do not work hard enough (a
behavior known as “shirking”). The equity holder may directly tell the CEO what to
do (“voice” or “monitoring”) or simply sell their shares to depress the share prices so
the company more likely becomes a target of acquisition (“exit”). This philosophy
of market discipline underlies the academic discipline of corporate governance.
But in order to tell the CEO what to do, the shareholders first have to be able
to evaluate whether the CEO has done a good job. This can be difficult, because
the CEO is hired as an expert which the shareholders are not. The performance
evaluation is in particular difficult when it comes to investment projects that reveal
their benefit only in the long term, such as innovation projects involving significant
research and development. So it is theoretically feasible that the shareholders are not
able to judge the value of R&D while it is being performed. Thus if given too much
power to discipline the CEO, the stock market may hamper corporate innovation.
In Chapter 4, I set out to empirically test this theoretical prediction. I show that
indeed if given the opportunity to monitor the CEO too frequently, shareholders
discipline may make the CEO reluctant to undertake R&D projects that are costly
in the short term but valuable in the long term. I establish the causal relationship
between evaluation horizon (the inverse of the frequency of “voice” mentioned above)
and corporate innovation by a requirement by the SEC in 2011. All US public firms
are asked to conduct shareholder voting to approve the CEO compensation proposal
(called the “say on pay”, or “SOP” for short) either once every year, or once every
three years. By comparing the innovation outcomes of companies with different
frequencies of SOP, I provide evidence of the relationship between evaluation horizon
and innovation. But if done as is, an endogeneity problem may arise since if given
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the choice of the horizon, companies that specialize in long term innovations may
also be the ones that choose infrequent evaluations. To address this problem, I take
advantage of a special term and condition imposed by the SEC: the frequency of
evaluation itself has to be determined for each company by shareholder votes. This
allows me to restrict the comparison to firms that voted narrowly in favor of high
frequency and those that voted narrowly in favor of low frequency. The firms that
narrowly passed three years are the considered the treatment group and the firms
that narrowly failed to pass a three year horizon are considered the control group.
Because of the narrow margin, the aforementioned endogeneity problem is likely to
be negligible. In summary, in this chapter I demonstrated that in the context of
corporate innovation, stock market discipline may stifle innovation when the market
is not able to accurately valuate innovations. This result speaks to the internet frenzy
in late 1990s when tech companies are valuated much higher than their true value.
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Chapter 2
Trading speed competition: Can the arms race go
too far?∗
∗This project is conducted in collaboration with Dion Bongaerts and Mark Van Achter.
Abstract
In our model, liquidity providers and demanders endogenously adopt costly speed
technology. Competition induces negative externalities on same-side traders, and
leads to over-investment in speed. However, execution probabilities increase in trans-
action speed, which generates positive externalities on other-side traders. Contrary
to popular belief, liquidity demanders are shown to be more prone to wasteful arms
races when marginal gains from trade (GFTs) are constant in transaction speed.
Yet, this results reverts with declining marginal GFTs, a setting which we provide
micro-foundations for.
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2.1 Introduction
In recent years, financial markets have been completely transformed by a newly-
emerging group of market participants: high-frequency traders (HFTs), which pro-
vide liquidity using computer algorithms at a millisecond pace. As of 2010, HFTs
generate at least 50% of volume, and even more so in terms of order traffic in the
US equity market.1 Facing such radical changes, policy makers in the US and the
European Union have called for a welfare assessment of HFTs, in order to design
appropriate regulation.2
The HFT emergence also induced a fierce academic debate. Proponents, like Bur-
ton Malkiel, argue that “competition among HFTs serves to tighten bid-ask-spreads,
reducing transaction costs for all market participants”.3 In contrast, the opponents,
including Paul Krugman, are concerned that HFTs undermine markets and use re-
sources that could have been put to better use.4 Meanwhile, the vastly growing
empirical literature on HFTs has provided evidence consistent with both claims. For
example, Brogaard et al. (2014) conclude that HFTs contribute to price discovery,
Malinova et al. (2013) show they improve liqudity, and Carrion (2013) finds they
provide liquidity when it is scarce. In contrast, several papers document that HFTs
reduce liquidity provision significantly in stressful times, in contrast to traditional
market makers (see Anand and Venkataraman (2015) and Korajczyk and Murphy
(2015)). Moreover, HFT technology is arguably very expensive for society (see Biais
et al. (2015b) for a discussion). For instance, in 2010, Spread Networks installed a
new $300 million high-speed fiber optic cable connecting New York and Chicago, to
reduce the latency of the existing route from 16 to 13 milliseconds. Meanwhile, that
improvement has already become virtually obsolete by the introduction of wireless
microwave technology in 2011, which managed to almost shave off an additional 5
1See the SEC (2010) concept release on equity market structure, and ”Casualties mount in
high-speed trading arms race”, Financial Times, Jan 22, 2015.
2See ”The Morning Risk Report: Future of High Frequency Trading Regulation is Murky”, Wall
Street Journal, January 30, 2014,. and ”High-Frequency Traders Get Curbs as EU Reins In Flash
Boys”, Bloomberg News, Apr 14, 2014, respectively.
3See ”High frequency trading is a natural part of trading evolution”, Financial Times, Dec 14,
2010.
4See ”Rewarding bad actors”, New York Times, Aug 2, 2009.
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milliseconds.5 Moreover, having some of the brightest minds in the world working
on the creation, detection or academic analysis of HFT algorithms implies a large
opportunity cost for society.
Our model sketches the relevant trade-offs to reconcile these two opposing views.
As such, it allows to analyze whether HFTs facilitate allocative efficiency in portfolios
sufficiently to justify its (opportunity) costs. In particular, we present two counter-
balancing effects HFTs induce on welfare. On the one hand, only the first trader
to react to a trading opportunity gains from her investments. As a result, other
traders which also invested in trading technology did so in vain (at least, for that
trading opportunity), as they arrived (often marginally) later. This negative exter-
nality, which we label “substitution effect”, materializes both at the liquidity-supply
and the liquidity-demand side.6 Biais et al. (2015a), among others, provide empir-
ical evidence that faster traders indeed obtain larger profits. On the other hand,
speedier HFT liquidity provision enlarges opportunities for liquidity demanders to
successfully transact, thereby stimulating market participation and investments in
trading technology from liquidity demanders. Hence, the interaction between both
market sides entails a positive externality, which we label as the “complementarity
effect”. This effect incorporates and even goes beyond the competition argument
put forward by Malkiel. We show that which of the two effects dominates cru-
cially depends on the expected value of each additional trade, or in other words
the expected marginal gains from trade (GFT). By and large, the existing literature
has (implicitly) assumed the expected marginal GFT to be constant in transaction
speed, mainly for tractability reasons. We relax this assumption and show that this
relaxation influences which of the two effects dominates. In particular, if expected
marginal GFTs increase in transaction speed the complimentarity effect is strength-
ened and over-investment in technology becomes less likely. If, on the other hand,
expected marginal GFTs decrease in transaction speed, the complementarity effect
5See Budish et al. (2015) and ”Networks Built on Milliseconds”, Wall Street Journal, May 30,
2012. for a discussion. Other infrastructure-related examples include the cost of co-location services
and of individual high-frequency data feeds.
6While the early empirical literature mainly focused on the changes in liquidity provision induced
by the emergence of high-frequency traders, a similar race is ongoing at the liquidity-demanding
side which increasingly applies high-speed algorithmic trading strategies.
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is weakened and over-investment in technology becomes more likely. We provide
micro-foundations for the latter by working through a portfolio rebalancing problem
with risk-aversion and stochastic and discrete trading opportunities. The reason that
expected marginal GFTs decline in the average frequency of trading opportunities
is that the likelihood of large portfolio dislocations and hence rebalancing needs in-
creases with the time elapsed since the previous trading opportunity at a rate that
is slower than linear.
For our analysis we borrow and extend the model by Foucault et al. (2013), who
use it to analyze the effect of make-take fees on market quality, but do not use it
to analyze arms race effects. The model is a stochastic monitoring model with two
types of agents: market makers which fill the book and market takers emptying
the book. When a transaction takes place, trading gains are realized as further
explained below. Each agent competes with agents of her own type for these gains in a
winner-take-all fashion.7 A speed improvement implies makers and takers have better
chances to be the first ones to respectively arrive to an empty or filled book. Yet,
lowering latency also implies a cost which is quadratically increasing in monitoring
intensity.8 When optimizing their monitoring speed, both agent types account for the
associated (marginal) costs and the obtainable marginal gains from trade (labeled
“marginal GFT”). The substitution and complementarity effects can be identified
from the optimization problems for both agent types. Both drive resource allocations
away from first best in opposite directions. The expected marginal GFT essentially
function as a weight on the complementarity effect. With more takers than makers,
arms race effects are more likely to be seen among takers than among makers as
the group on which negative externalities are exerted is relatively large and the
group on which positive externalities are exerted is relatively small. This preliminary
conclusion would go against the popular perception that arms races would be more
7Thus, the fastest trader is the only one that profits from a standing trading opportunity. In
particular, the first maker to arrive to an empty book can post a sell limit order. Subsequent makers
arriving to the book need to wait till the book is empty again. The first taker to arrive to a filled
book can transact at the standing sell order. Subsequent takers arriving to the book need to wait
till the book is filled again.
8This reflects the increasingly costly investments in human capital and IT-infrastructure (which
become increasingly costly the more we approach the speed of light).
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prevalent among makers.
Assuming the expected marginal GFTs to be constant leads to a tractable model
with closed-form solutions. This is probably one of the reasons why many papers have
made this assumption (albeit often implicitly; see for example, Biais et al. (2015b),
Foucault et al. (2013) and Hoffmann (2014))). We generalize the model by assuming
the expected marginal GFTs to be a strictly monotonic and differentiable function of
average transaction speed. This compromises tractability as solving the model now
involves finding the roots of a quintic function, which is analytically generally not
possible. Yet, this generalization is important as it (i) materially affects the weight
on the complementarity effect, and (ii) is much more plausible, as later on shown by
our micro-foundations. We manage to show the incremental effect by analyzing the
first-order conditions for makers and takers and highlighting additional terms that are
monotonic in the dependence of GFTs on transaction frequency. More specifically, we
show that with decreasing expected marginal GFTs, the additional effects we identify
increase the likelihood of over-investment (and hence arm races) among makers, and
reduce the likelihood of over-investment among takers.9 These findings could bring
our results more in line with the popular belief that arms races are more prevalent
among makers. We illustrate these findings with numerical examples.
The last step of our main analysis provides micro-foundations that expected
marginal GFTs are declining in transaction frequency. Or in other words, that on
average, each additional trade that takes place as a result from upgrades in trading
speed technology is less valuable than the previous one. To this end, a portfolio
rebalancing problem for an investor with log utility and access to a risky and risk-
free asset is set up. Due to the log utility, the investor would like the weights on
both assets in his portfolio constant. This creates a continuous rebalancing motive
as prices of the risky asset continuously move. However, trading is only possible at
stochastically determined discrete points in time. For every trade the gain from trade
is given by the increase in investor utility due to the trade. This utility improvement
is increasing in the price move of the risky asset since the previous trade. Since the
9Naturally, the effects work the opposite way when expected marginal GFTs increase with
transaction frequency.
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variance of returns increases in the square root of time, each additional trading op-
portunity is valuable, but its expected value is decreasing in the frequency at which
such trading opportunities arise. A similar case can be made for a risk-averse investor
dynamically hedging a non-linear derivative (portfolio).
From a modeling perspective, the closest paper to ours is by Foucault et al. (2013),
as we largely draw on their model. The economic effects of the two opposing forces on
over- or under-investment are also in their model, but are only used in the discussion
on make-take fees. We link their model to the aggregate welfare question of HFTs,
and most crucially show the importance of properly modeling the marginal GFTs as
these will serve as weights on the two countervailing forces. Our paper provides a
further contribution in outlining the micro-foundations for declining marginal GFT
with risk-averse takers.
Our paper also contributes to the rapidly expanding theoretical literature on the
effect HFTs have on welfare. Many recent papers focus on the asymmetric informa-
tion channel (i.e., the pick-off risk slow traders face) when evaluating the welfare con-
sequences of speed technology (e.g., Biais et al. (2015b), Budish et al. (2015), Cespa
and Vives (2015), Hoffmann (2014), Jovanovic and Menkveld (2015), Menkveld and
Yueshen (2012), and Rojcek and Ziegler (2016). Other papers, such as Aı¨t-Sahalia
and Saglam (2014), explore the welfare impact of the inventory channel (i.e., HFTs
are more efficient in optimizing their inventories over time). We document that phys-
ical and human capital (opportunity) costs alone suffice to induce a wasteful arms
race, and we obtain welfare losses even in the absence of the aforementioned channels.
Furthermore, we show that the commonly-made assumptions of constant marginal
GFT and risk-neutral investors may induce an underweighting (in the model) of the
negative substitution externality HFTs exert. Adverse selection is then needed to
generate arms race effects on the maker side.
Taking a broader view, our model shows similarities with traditional imperfect
competition models such as Cournot (1838). The intensity in our model is (to a large
extent) equivalent with quantity in such models. In these models, producers typically
face a downward sloping demand curve. The declining marginal gains from trade we
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provide micro-foundations for are consistent with such a downward sloping demand
curve. Yet, there are also key differences with these traditional models. First, our
model features competition on both sides of a trade, because makers and takers both
compete for profitable trading opportunities. Second, the way individual monitor-
ing intensities translate to transaction intensities generates interesting patterns. The
stochastic winner-takes-all feature of trading induces more over-investment. In ad-
dition, the interaction of how buy and sell side monitoring intensities translate to
transaction intensities generates the complementarity effect.
2.2 Setup
The setup of our model is based Foucault et al. (2013). We consider a market
with two types of participants: market makers and market takers. Each maker i ∈
{1, 2, . . . ,M} monitors the market at discrete points in time and arrives according to
a Poisson process with (endogenously chosen) intensity parameter µi ≥ 0. Similarly,
each taker j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} arrives with (endogenously chosen) intensity τj ≥ 0. The
total numbers of makers and takers, M and N , are exogenous.10 By assumption,
there is no form of information asymmetry present.
We assume that there is a market mechanism to bring together liquidity demand
and supply. Crucially, at this stage we write the model in its most general form and
the market mechanism can take many forms. The way in which maker and taker
intensities map into expected trading intensities depends on the market mechanism.
More generally, we define r as the transaction intensity and further define
E(r) = f(
∑
i
µi,
∑
j
τj), (2.1)
where the underline indicates a vector of intensities. We do require the expected
trading intensity to be a strictly increasing function of both the maker and the taker
10This setup has a winner-takes-all feature from an ex-post perspective (i.e., the one conducting
the trade is the only one benefitting). From an ex-ante perspective, the fastest trader is not guar-
anteed to always execute. This setup is chosen based on the notion of order processing uncertainty:
the fast trader never knows what is going to happen after she submits the order and before it reaches
the server of the exchange. A similar argument can be found in Yueshen (2014).
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intensities. In other words, we require that
∂f(µ, τ)
∂µi
> 0,
∂f(µ, τ)
∂τj
> 0. (2.2)
The market operates according to the following timeline: before trading be-
gins, each maker i chooses an intensity µi to maximize her expected trading profit
Πm(µi).11 Similarly, each taker j chooses τj to maximize her expected trading profit
Πt(τj). Once the trading begins, each player monitors the market following a Poisson
process with the intensity previously chosen. Every time the trader arrives to the
market he can submit an order to trade one unit of the security. For the moment, we
assume that the trading phase of the model repeats itself an infinite number of times.
One should notice that while trading happens indefinitely, the model is in essence
a one-shot model as arrival intensities are chosen once at the start of the game and
kept constant throughout.
In our model, monitoring speed does not come for free. In particular, we as-
sume the per period monitoring costs (in clock time, not transaction time!) for both
trader types to be quadratically increasing in the monitoring frequency chosen. These
costs reflect the required investments in IT-infrastructure and human capital. The
marginal cost of technology is increasing, reflecting the observation that as latency
approaches zero, the cost for such advancement becomes higher and higher.12 Mon-
itoring costs can differ between the makers and the takers. This difference allows
to assess the impact of heterogeneity in know-how (i.e., a knowledge endowment)
among the market participants. We denote the cost per unit of time for maker i
by Cm(µi) = βµ2i /2, while for taker j it equals Ct(τj) = γτ2j /2. One should note
that since trading continues indefinitely, we are interested in the per period costs
compared to the per period revenues.
Finally, when a transaction takes place, the gains from trade (GFT) are split
between between maker and taker according to the fractions pim and pit = 1 − pim,
11In this sense the agents in our models are the prop traders in Biais et al. (2015a)
12For example, to improve latency from a second to a tenth of a second, one would “only” need
to automate the trading using algorithms. To get to the millisecond level, however, co-location and
super-fast communication lines are required, which are significantly more costly.
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respectively, where pim ∈ (0, 1).13 The expected GFT for an additional trade or the
expected marginal GFT originated by liquidity taker j are given by a (weakly) mono-
tonically increasing and continuously differentiable function G
( τj
τ¯ r
)
of his expected
trading frequency. We assume that the GFT arise from the portfolio selection and
consumption need of the takers. This is supported by the reality that in financial mar-
kets, the market takers are usually the parties with the intention to hold the security
over an horizon exceeding a day, while the makers mainly serve as short term interme-
diaries. In Section A.1, we will provide further micro-foundations for this assumption.
Relatedly, the expected GFT per unit of time is given by W
( τj
τ¯ r
)
=
( τj
τ¯ r
)
G
( τj
τ¯ r
)
.
W (·) is our measure of social welfare. One can prove that concavity of W (·) is equiv-
alent to the G(·) function being uniformly decreasing in expected trading speed on
its domain.
2.3 Equilibrium Analysis and Welfare
In this section, we first set out to define the first best solution and equilibrium
outcome of the model. Moreover, we define what we mean with over- and under-
investment in trading technology. Next, we solve the model for the case of constant
expected marginal GFT, i.e., G(·) = G0. Thereafter, we continue by solving the
model in its more general form, namely for any monotonic and differentiable function
G(·). Because tractability in the general case is low, the argument can only be made
by analyzing the difference between first-order conditions a social planner faces and
those that market participants face. Having established a general result that depends
on the expected marginal GFT function, we provide micro-foundations for the shape
of this function. We finish the section by illustrating our model outcomes with
graphical representations of numerical examples.
2.3.1 First best and equilibrium definitions
In this subsection, we define the first-best outcome, the equilibrium outcome,
and under- and over-monitoring. Let us start by deriving the first best outcome as
the solution of a social planner’s problem, where the social planner only cares about
13Participation incentives dictate that pim ∈ (0, 1) must hold on average. Because we abstract
from informed trading, this must even hold for each individual trade.
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aggregate welfare.
Definition 1 Social Planner’s Problem
A social planner chooses {µi}i=1,2,...,M and {τj}j=1,2,...,N to maximize aggregate
social welfare:
N∑
j=1
W
(
τj
τ¯
r
)
−
M∑
i=1
βµ2i
2 −
N∑
j=1
γτ2j
2 , (2.3)
such that µi ≥ 0,∀i ≤M ; τj ≥ 0,∀j ≤M .
As can be gauged from this objective function, the social planner only focuses on
the aggregate gains from trade which are realized by the interaction between makers
and takers. It does not account for the distribution of these gains between makers
and takers (i.e., pim does not show up in this equation).
Next, we define an equilibrium as the outcome of the setting in which makers and
takers individually optimize their intensities given the optimal strategies of all other
players (i.e., we look for a Nash equilibrium).
Definition 2 Equilibrium
The equilibrium that we consider is a Nash equilibrium defined by intensity choices
{µi}i=1,2,...,M and {τj}j=1,2,...,N , such that:
1. Given all taker intensities, {τj}j=1,2,...,N , as well as all other maker intensities:
{µn}n=1,2,...,i−1,i+1,...,M each maker i maximizes her profit after cost:
pim
µi
µ¯
N∑
j=1
W
(
τj
τ¯ r
)
− βµ
2
i
2
2. Given all maker intensities, {µi}i=1,2,...,M , as well as all other taker’s choice:
{τn}n=1,2,...,j−1,j+1,...,Neach taker j maximizes her profit after cost:
(1− pim)W
(
τj
τ¯ r
)
− γτ
2
j
2
where µi ≥ 0, and τj ≥ 0.
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We define over- and under-investment by makers and takers as the equilibrium τˆ
and µˆ respectively exceeding and falling short of their first-best counterparts.
We will now compare equilibrium outcomes to first best outcomes, and will ex-
plicitly consider the functional form of G(·). Doing so will prove to be crucial to
determine whether wasteful arms races occur. The current literature mostly assumes
that G(·) is constant, irrespective of the trading speed (for example, Biais et al.
(2015b), Foucault et al. (2013) and Hoffmann (2014)). We therefore first solve the
model for constant G(·) as a benchmark.
2.3.2 Benchmark Case: constant expected marginal GFT
In this case, each transaction that takes place generates the same amount of
social welfare, and we have that G(·) = G0. Hence, the aggregate GFT is linear in
the expected trading frequency of the taker involved.
In first best, the FOCs of the social planner’s optimization problem should hold,
whereas in equilibrium those of the individual market participants should hold. The
first order conditions are given by the following lemma.
Lemma 3 FOCs of constant GFT setting
The first order conditions of the SPP and the individual maker optimization problems
are given by
G0
∂r
∂µi
= βµi, (SPP FOC µ) (2.4)
G0pim
(
µi
µ¯
∂r
∂µi
+ µi
µ¯2
r
)
= βµi. (maker FOC) (2.5)
The equivalent expressions for takers are fully symmetric.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Using the concavity properties of r, one can show that if pim were large, over
monitoring would occur, whereas if pim is sufficiently small under-monitoring occurs.
The intuition for over-monitoring is that individual makers do not endogenize the
negative effect their speed increase has on the transaction likelihood of other makers
(substitution effect). The intuition for under-monitoring is that due to the fact that
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only a part of the surplus can be captured, there is insufficient incentive to invest in
monitoring capacity (complementarity effect).
To make our setting more concrete we now assume a trading mechanism in the
form of a limit order book that has capacity for only one limit order at a time. In order
for a transaction to take place, the limit order book needs to be filled and a market
order needs to arrive. By the properties of the Poisson distribution, the aggregate
monitoring process of all makers jointly also follows a Poisson distribution with the
following intensity: µ¯ =
∑M
i=1 µi. Similarly, the aggregate monitoring intensity of
all takers jointly equals τ¯ =
∑N
j=1 τj . Consequently, the expected interval between
a transaction and replenishment of the book equals Dm = 1/µ¯. Analogously, the
expected interval between the posting of a limit order and transaction is given by
Dt = 1/τ¯ . Thus on average, the duration between two trades is D = Dm +Dt, and
the average trading frequency equals r = (Dm + Dt)−1 = µ¯τ¯µ¯+τ¯ . Similarly, one can
show that for a given liquidity taker j with monitoring intensity τj , the expected
trading frequency is given by τj µ¯µ¯+τ¯ =
τj
τ¯ r.
Proposition 1 First Best with Constant Marginal GFT
The first best monitoring intensities are symmetric and given by:
µˆ = N
2
(Mrˆ +N)2
G0
β
, τˆ = M
2rˆ2
(Mrˆ +N)2
G0
γ
; where rˆ =
(
N2
M2
γ
β
) 1
3
.
The resulting aggregate welfare equals:
Πˆ = MµˆNτˆ
Mµˆ+Nτˆ G0 −
βMµˆ2
2 −
γNτˆ2
2 .
Proof. See Appendix. 
The economic intuition behind this solution is as follows. First, the optimal maker
intensity µˆ increases in the expected marginal GFT, G0, because higher G0 justifies
higher investments in monitoring technology to be made. Second, µˆ decreases in
the marginal monitoring cost for makers, β, due to the increasing marginal cost of
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monitoring intensity. Third, µˆ decreases in the number of makers, M , since it is
the aggregate intensity that the social planner cares about and individual costs are
quadratic in monitoring intensity. The more makers there are, the lower the required
frequently for each individual maker; this we call the ”substitution effect.” In addition
to the within-type effects outlined above, cross-type effects can also be observed.
First, the optimal maker intensity µˆ decreases in the marginal cost of the takers,
γ. This happens because maker intensity and taker intensity are complementary.
After all, high monitoring by takers is only useful if the book is likely to be F and
high monitoring intensity by makers is only worthwhile if the book is likely to be E.
Hence, makers and takers impose positive externalities on each other; this we call
the ”complementarity effect.” Second, µˆ increases in the numbers of takers N due to
the same type of complementarity. Third, this complementarity effect can also be
seen from the first term of the formula for the aggregate welfare (i.e., MµˆNτˆMµˆ+NτˆG0).
Unilateral increases in maker intensity µˆ will increase the total welfare not only by
a factor of M , but also by N , the number of takers. All six interpretations above
apply to the taker intensities τˆ too (for the constant expected marginal GFT, the
problem is symmetric).
In reality, however, the first best outcome typically does not materialize. There-
fore, we now proceed by solving for the equilibrium of this economy and compare
it with the first best outcome outlined above. While solving in closed form is not
possible, we follow Foucault et al. (2013) and obtain an implicit solution for the
equilibrium with constant expected marginal GFT.
Proposition 2 Equilibrium with Constant Marginal GFT
The equilibrium monitoring intensity for makers and takers is given by:
µ∗ = M + (M − 1)τ
∗
M(1 + r∗)2
G0pim
β
, (2.6)
τ∗ = r
∗((1 + r∗)N − 1)
N(1 + r∗)2
G0pit
γ
, (2.7)
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respectively, where r∗ is the positive real solution to:
Nr3 + (N − 1)r2 − (M − 1)zr −Mz = 0
with z ≡ γpimβpit .
The resulting aggregate welfare is given by:
Π∗ = Mµ
∗Nτ∗
(Mµ∗ +Nτ∗)G0 −
βMµ∗2
2 −
γNτ∗2
2 . (2.8)
Proof. See Appendix. 
An easy comparison between the equilibrium and first best monitoring intensities
is not possible because the equilibrium expressions involve r∗ which is implicitly
defined. However, we are able to obtain intuition of the forces at work by comparing
the first order conditions behind the first-best and the equilibrium outcomes.
Substituting for r and ∂r∂µi in (2.4) and (2.5), we get the following first order
conditions of the SPP and the individual maker optimization problems
G0
τ¯2
(µ¯+ τ¯)2 = βµi, (SPP FOC µ) (2.9)
G0pim
τ¯2 + µ−iτ¯
(µ¯+ τ¯)2 = βµi, (maker FOC) (2.10)
where µ−i ≡
∑j≤M
j 6=i µj . The equivalent expressions for takers are fully symmetric.
In these FOCs, we can see that the complementarity effect and the substitution
effect give rise to positive and negative externalities. First, observe that the LHS
of the SPP-FOC has a multiplier G0, while in the maker-FOC this multiplier is
given by G0pim. Since pim ∈ (0, 1), this multiplier is smaller, and hence an individual
taker does not fully endogenize the complementarity effect her activity induces on
her counter-parties (this makes it a positive externality). As a result, makers are in
equilibrium inclined to under-monitor as compared to the first best. Secondly, the
numerators of the LHSs of the two FOCs differ by a term µ−iτ¯ , which increases the
equilibrium intensities relative to the first-best intensities. The intuition behind this
Chapter 2. Trading speed competition: Can the arms race go too far? 15
is as follows. Increasing one’s own intensity increases the transaction probability for
the individual maker or taker, but also reduces the effectiveness of orders sent by all
competitors as limit orders are more likely to hit a full book and market orders more
likely to hit an empty book. Because this effect on competitors is not endogenized by
individual makers or takers, this substitution effect gives rise to a negative externality
on same-side market participants.
For takers the problem is completely symmetric here and all intuition carries
over. The two effects described above are (partially) offsetting. Which of the two
dominates depends on parameters. Also here the FOCs provide guidance. A larger
pim reduces the complementarity effect for makers and strengthens it for takers (as
pit = 1− pim). If M is small, all liquidity needs to be provided by a small number of
makers. Because costs are quadratic in monitoring intensity, and because the number
of competitors is small in this case, we have that µ−iτ¯(µ¯+τ¯)2 is small as well, limiting the
substitution effect and making an arms race less likely.
2.3.3 Relaxing the constant expected marginal GFT assumption
In this subsection we conduct a similar analysis as in the previous section, but then
with a more general functional form for the expected marginal GFT. In particular, if
G(·) is a monotonic and differentiable function of transaction frequency τj µ¯µ¯+τ¯ , then we
can obtain the respective FOCs for the SPP and individual market participants by
subsequently applying the product rule and chain rule for differentiation. Imposing
symmetry among players of the same type, we get the following expressions for the
FOCs w.r.t. maker and taker intensities:
Lemma 4 If G(·) is a monotonic and differentiable function of transaction frequency
τj µ¯
µ¯+τ¯ , the first order conditions of the SPP and the individual maker and taker opti-
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mization problems are given by:
βµi = G
(
µ¯τ¯/N
µ¯+ τ¯
)
τ¯2
(µ¯+ τ¯)2 +G
′
(
µ¯τ¯/N
µ¯+ τ¯
)
µ¯τ¯3/N
(µ¯+ τ¯)3 , (SPP FOC µ) (2.11)
βµi =
(
G
(
µ¯τ¯/N
µ¯+ τ¯
)
τ¯(µ−i + τ¯)
(µ¯+ τ¯)2 +G
′
(
µ¯τ¯/N
µ¯+ τ¯
)
µ¯τ¯3/N
(µ¯+ τ¯)3
µi
µ¯
)
pim, (maker FOC)
(2.12)
γτj = G
(
µ¯τj
µ¯+ τ¯
)
µ¯2
(µ¯+ τ¯)2 +G
′
(
µ¯τj
µ¯+ τ¯
)
µ¯3τj
(µ¯+ τ¯)3 , (SPP FOC τ) (2.13)
γτj =
(
G
(
µ¯τj
µ¯+ τ¯
)
µ¯(µ¯+ τ−j)
(µ¯+ τ¯)2 +G
′
(
µ¯τj
µ¯+ τ¯
)
µ¯2τj(µ¯+ τ−j)
(τ¯ + µ¯)3
)
(1− pim). (taker FOC)
(2.14)
What is clear from both sets of equations is that compared to the constant ex-
pected marginal GFT, there is now a term involving G′(·) that enters with a strictly
positive coefficient since intensities are always (strictly) positive. The effect of these
terms differs (i) between makers and takers and (ii) between welfare maximization
and individual profit maximization of market participants. In particular, this term
in the FOC on the µs is less prominent for individual makers than for a social plan-
ner. Hence, if G′ > 0, makers tend to under-monitor more and if G′ < 0 they tend
to over-monitor more. The reason is that if G′ < 0, an increase in speed lowers at
the margin the welfare that is created by each additional trade. However, since each
maker can only expect to be present in a fraction µiµ¯ < 1 of all trades, this is not fully
endogenized and enters as a negative externality. For takers, on the other hand, the
reverse result holds. if G′ > 0, takers tend to over-monitor more and if G′ < 0 they
tend to under-monitor more. If G′ < 0, an increase in speed reduces the marginal
value of each trade for a specific taker, just as in the social planner’s problem, be-
cause numerator of the argument of G(·) only involves the transaction speed of an
individual taker. However, for the social planner, a higher taker intensity lowers the
rate at which marginal GFT deteriorate for other takers because of the substitution
effect. An individual taker does not endogenize this and hence, the term involving
G′(·) is relatively more important. Therefore, individual takers are more prone to
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under- rather than over-invest in monitoring speed when expected marginal gains
from trade are declining in transaction speed. We can also analyze the moderating
effect of relative bargaining power by looking at these FOCs. The term involving
G′ in (2.12) is relatively more important when pim is large. One should note that
this is already the situation in which even with constant expected marginal gains
from trade over-investment by makers is more likely. In this case, under-investment
on the taker side is likely, but the additional term involving G′ gets little weight,
such that under-investment problems are hardly amplified. By contrast, if pim is low,
under-investment on the maker side is likely, and the term involving G′ attenuates
the under-investment problem, but only a little. On the taker side, a low pim leads
to likely over-investment on the taker side, which is heavily attenuated by the term
involving G′. Our findings are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Compared to the constant marginal gains from trade case, if expected
marginal gains from trade are monotonically decreasing in expected transaction speed,
then in equilibrium
1. Makers are more likely to over-invest and less likely to under-invest
2. Makers over-invest more or under-invest less
3. Takers are more likely to under-invest and less likely to over-invest
4. Takers under-invest more or over-invest less
5. These effects positively interact with pim for makers and negatively for takers,
such that arms races are particularly likely and severe among makers and pri-
marily when makers have relatively much bargaining power.
The reverse holds if expected marginal gains from trade are uniformly increasing
in expected transaction speed.
Proof. See Appendix. 
These findings have important ramifications. We typically observe in markets the
number of takers to be much larger than the number of makers. As a result, with
constant expected marginal GFT, investments in monitoring speed by takers lead to
a relatively larger substitution effect. After all, the group of peers that are negatively
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affected by investments in speed technology of a given taker is larger. For makers,
the substitution effect should be relatively larger, leading to under-investment as the
group on which they extend positive externalities is larger. For takers, the comple-
mentarity effect should be relatively larger, leading to over-investment as the group
on which they extend negative externalities is larger. If expected marginal GFT are
declining in transaction speed, as we will argue in the next section, the additional
terms in Equations (2.11) to (2.14) counter these effects, both for takers as well as
for makers, and in particular when bargaining power for makers is high. Hence, we
are much more likely to see over-investment by makers, a concern often expressed by
regulators and policy makers.
2.3.4 Are expected marginal GFT increasing or decreasing with speed?
In the previous section we saw the crucial importance of the shape of the expected
marginal GFT function G(·) when analyzing welfare effects of HFTs. One would
naturally like to know which shape of G(·) would be most plausible. We argue that
G(·) is most likely to be downward sloping in transaction speed. We present two very
much related settings, micro-foundations, in which such shape materializes naturally.
In the first setting, we consider an economy with two assets; one risky and one
risk-free. The value of the risky asset follows a geometric Brownian motion. There
is an investor with initial wealth and log utility with risk-aversion coefficient δ. This
investor needs to continuously optimize a consumption and portfolio allocation prob-
lem. Due to his log utility, the investor would like to maintain fixed portfolio weights
on the risky and risk-free assets. Because the price of the risky asset fluctuates con-
tinuously, this investor has a continuous rebalancing need. However, rebalancing is
possible only at stochastic but discrete points in time. Whenever a rebalancing trade
takes place a fraction pim of the welfare gain resulting from the trade accrues to the
liquidity provider of the trade and hence is a welfare loss to the investor. In the end,
we are interested in how average aggregate welfare created by trading depends on the
arrival frequency of trading opportunities. This tells us how G(·) depends on τj µ¯µ¯+τ¯ .
We solve this portfolio rebalancing problem in Appendix A.1. A portfolio rebalancing
problem with transaction costs is traditionally very hard to solve, because for fixed
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transaction costs there are thresholds for trading to take place. As a result, trading
will not happen at each opportunity. Because we impose transaction costs that are
proportional to welfare created by trading, trading takes place when the opportunity
arises with probability 1. As a result, we can solve an equivalent problem that does
not feature transaction costs. For this equivalent problem, we then show that the
expected marginal gains from trade are decreasing in the arrival frequency of trading
opportunities as the need to trade closely after the previous trade is not very high.
It is simply very unlikely that since the previous trade the price of the risky asset
has moved a lot and hence, the portfolio is still close to its optimum.
A very similar result materializes for a risk-averse hedger or arbitrage trader that
wants to dynamically hedge a position in an (exotic) non-linear derivative by trading
in the spot and money market. Since non-linear derivatives typically have a Gamma
exposure, there is a need to constantly rebalance the position. However, trading is
only possible at stochastic but discrete points in time. Because of risk-aversion, each
trade creates welfare. As before, transaction costs proportional to welfare created
are irrelevant for trading decisions and therefore welfare patterns (they only lead to
a level shift). For similar reasons as above, the marginal value of an additional trade
declines with the arrival frequency of trading opportunities.
2.3.5 Numerical illustration
To illustrate the effect of the non-constant expected marginal GFT, we present
numerical examples to illustrate our point.
In this exercise, we visualize the maker and taker intensities relative to first best.
To enable 3D-plotting, we reduce the number of free parameters by restricting our
model parameters as follows: we set G0 = 1 and β = γ. Then, we make plots of the
under- and over-monitoring of either type as a function of the profit split ratio pim
and the cost coefficient β, for several combinations of (M,N). In particular, we plot
the following combinations of M and N : (2, 2); (2, 20); (50, 250). We set the number
of takers larger or equal to the number of makers as, in reality, there are usually
more liquidity demanders than suppliers in any particular market.
Figure A.1 presents the graphs for the constant expected marginal GFT. Let us
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highlight some features of the plots consistent with our intuition. First, as argued
above, the smaller the cost coefficient (β, γ), the more monitoring diverges from first
best (i.e., over- and under-monitoring are generated). Second, over-monitoring is
more likely to happen when there are more makers and/or takers competing on the
same side of the market. In this case there are more competitors, and hence more
sources of negative substitution externalities.
Our main observation from this figure is that for relatively small values of M
and N , neither side over-monitors severely. The first column in Figure A.1, which
corresponds to the case when M = 2 and N = 2, shows no over-monitoring at all.
The arms race only begins gradually from N = 20. Even with (M,N) = (2, 20)
over-monitoring is still very limited as shown in the second column of Figure A.1.
When we look at the third column of the figure, we notice that as the market size
grows, the substitution effect starts to dominate the complementarity effect more
and more. Yet, especially for the makers, we see large parameter ranges where there
is under- rather than over-monitoring. Only for relatively high values of pim, do we
see over-monitoring among makers. This also intuitively makes sense as a higher
value for pim gives more value to being the first one to execute a trade and lowers
the benefit of the takers to invest in trading technology in response to an upgrade in
maker technology and speed.
These results tell us that when the expected marginal GFT are constant, the
complementary effect can easily start to dominate the substitution effect. Moreover,
if an arms race is going on, it is on the taker rather than on the maker side, due to
the relatively higher presence of the takers in the market. This is in contrast with
the mainstream view on the arms race that it is more likely to occur among makers.
In addition, it stands out from the figure that the over-monitoring of the takers
only occurs when pim is close to 0.5, that is, the two sides have similar bargaining
power. An intuitive explanation is that when pim is too small, there are not enough
makers to generate enough positive externality to motivate sufficient monitoring of
the takers, let alone the over-monitoring. On the other hand, when pim is large, takers
benefit little from trading and will invest too little. This observation suggests that
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the relative market power of the liquidity suppliers and demanders, in addition to
their speed and their sheer numbers, can also be relevant factors to take into account
when designing regulatory measures to ensure efficient monitoring.
We next present the same graphs in Figures A.2, A.3, and A.4, but for a setting
in which the expected marginal GFT is linearly declining in transaction frequency
with slope coefficient G1. In particular, we set G1 to 1, 0.2 and 5, respectively.
Moreover, in order to maximize comparability, we keep the same value for G0 as we
used in the case with constant expected marginal GFT. When G1 = 1 and holding
constant the number of makers and takers, we observe that the tendency for makers
to over-monitor is higher compared to Figure A.1. Moreover, even for small values of
M , makers only over-monitor in this setup, and hardly ever in the constant expected
marginal GFT setup. Figures A.3 and A.4 show that as the slope steepens, the over-
monitoring becomes more severe, demonstrating that the nature of the marginal gains
from trade plays an important role in determining the occurrence of the arms race.
2.4 Robustness and extensions
2.4.1 Other externalities
Competition in speed may have positive externalities in the sense that it boosts
technological progress and knowledge. Other industries may benefit from this progress
in unanticipated ways. As an example, the internet was developed for internal and
largely military purposes, but in an unanticipated way massively improved productiv-
ity and living standards across the globe. The model is able to capture such features
easily in reduced form. To this end, we can define β˜ = (1 − ζ)β (and analogously
γ˜) as the social costs of speed technology development and adoption after control-
ling for cross-product externalities captured by the term ζ. Similarly, one could
incorporate negative externalities too by setting β˜ = (1 − ζ + ξ)β, where ξ is the
negative externality, for example resulting from increased information asymmetry.
The effect of such generalizations is rather straightforward. As these are externali-
ties, social cost parameters increase or decrease while cost parameters for individual
optimization problems remain unaffected. Hence, larger ζ leads to under-investment
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in technology, while larger ξ leads to over-investment.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored whether competition on speed among stock market
participants is likely to trigger arms races, leading to socially wasteful investments.
We highlight two opposing economic channels that influence such effect in opposing
and partially offsetting ways. Competition among makers as a group and among
takers as a group may indeed trigger arms races in the classical sense. However, a
complementarity between the two sides, the increased success rate of trading, may
offset this competition effect if the gains from trade are large enough. Therefore,
the likelihood of arms races depends on how gains from trade depend on transaction
frequency. The expected marginal GFT essentially acts as a weight on the com-
plementarity effect. We show that if the expected marginal GFT is declining in
transaction speed, the weight on the complementarity effect declines and arms races
are more likely to occur. This we also illustrate graphically and numerically. Us-
ing a portfolio rebalancing model, we show that expected marginal GFT are indeed
likely to be declining in transaction frequency. Intuitively, the gains realized in a
trade shrink the smaller the time interval in between subsequent trades. Under this
new more realistic specification, arms races are more likely to occur than under the
standard paradigm in the literature (featuring constant expected marginal GFT).
We provide several extensions to the model. For example we show that the model
can incorporate in reduced form other externalities, like on unrelated technological
progress.
While providing important insights, our model does make some concessions to
reality. A potential concern is that it does not allow for the dual role of participants
in modern limit order markets. Yet, in fact this concern is not as grave as one would
think. After all, there is a group of market participants that are likely to show a
net demand for liquidity. Moreover there is a group that on net will be providing
liquidity. This is what in the end generates the welfare gains. Trades among makers,
which currently are very common, are zero sum within the group of makers (one
maker could have been the only intermediary rather than a whole chain). The single
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role assumption massively simplifies our problem, leading to better tractability.
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Asset risk and bank runs∗
∗This project is conducted in collaboration with Dion Bongaerts.
Abstract
We introduce a bank-run model similar to Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) with 1.)
balance sheet equity and 2.) a menu of risk choices available to the bank. Elevated
risk increases the chances of insolvency and hence may trigger bank runs. However,
elevated risk is also associated with higher returns in good state of the world. These
create additional capital buffers for debt holders and hence lower the probability of
insolvency and therefore also bank runs. Since expected returns and bank capital
are essentially substitutes, the latter effect dominates when the marginal benefit of
additional capital is high (i.e., capital is low).
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3.1 Introduction
Banks are unique financial institutions due to the composition of their balance
sheets. Having an asset side primarily comprised of illiquid assets and a liability
side primarily comprise of liquid overnight deposits, a banks fulfills a useful liquidity
creation function in the economy. Yet, at the same time this special structure also
leads to inherent fragility in the sense that banks are highly exposed to liquidity risk
(and much more so than corporates). In particular, banks are exposed to the risk
of bank runs. A bank run occurs when so many depositors withdraw their deposits
that the long term assets of the bank have to be liquidated in a fire sale to satisfy
their withdrawal. In such a run, many depositors without a liquidity need withdraw
their money out of a precautionary motive. Due to fire-sale discounts, such runs
usually result in losses for the bank and the depositors. Interestingly, such runs
can happen even when the fundamentals of the bank assets are sound Diamond and
Dybvig (1983), reflecting coordination failures among depositors. The financial crisis
of 2007-2009 highlighted the potential devastating effects of such liquidity risk.
There are two standard solutions to make banks safer: 1.) reducing risk on
the asset side, and 2.) increase capital ratios on the liability side (see for example,
Admati and Hellwig (2014) and Cochrane (2014)). The intuition as to why these
measures work can be directly derived from a simple Merton (1973) model. Reducing
risk on the asset side reduces the volatility of returns to the firm value, thereby
increases the distance to default and decreases default risk. Similarly, Increasing
capital ratios decreases leverage which in turn increases the distance to default and
decreases default risk. Hence, reducing asset risk and increasing capitalization ratios
are substitutes. Moreover, these effects are not specific to banks. They apply to any
corporate as well.
Banks are, however, different from regular corporates in the sense that they are
exposed to the risk of bank runs. If fundamentals are expected to be poor in the
future and there are costs to the premature liquidation of long-term investments,
depositors may prematurely run on the bank. This may result in 1.) premature
defaults due to liquidation proceeds being insufficient to repay redemptions, or 2.)
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eventual defaults because premature redemptions generated liquidation losses that
are sufficiently large to compromise the repayment of depositors that did not redeem
prematurely, irrespective of whether the long-term investment projects yield a high or
low return. The prospect of situation 1.) would discourage depositors from running,
while the prospect of situation 2.) would induce them to run.
We set up a bank run model along the lines of Goldstein and Pauzner (2005),
but with two extensions. First, we explicitly model equity as a residual claim on
the bank’s balance sheet. As a result, equity serves as loss absorbtion capacity for
depositors. Second, we allow for a range of different portfolio risk levels for banks
that are disclosed in full to the public. As in almost all bank run models, the long
term investments on the asset side have a binary payoff distribution.
An increase in asset risk (holding expected returns constant) would increase struc-
tural default risk and hence would make situation 2.) more likely and stimulate runs.
Yet, higher risk also comes with higher returns in good scenarios, which serve as loss
absorbtion capacity in situation 2.) and hence are a substitute for equity. Which of
the two effects of increased risk taking dominates depends on the capitalization ratio
of the bank. When the capitalization ratio is low, the marginal value of an addi-
tional unit of loss absorption capacity is high and increased risk taking will lower the
probability of bank runs. When the capitalization ratio is high, the marginal value
of an additional unit of loss absorption capacity is low and increased risk taking will
increase the probability of bank runs.
Note that in the absence of bank runs, there would not be any mitigating effect
of higher returns in good states on default risk since the higher returns would only
materialize in the good state, in which they are irrelevant for avoiding default risk.
Because bank runs can generate problems with regards to solvency even when a bank
survives the initial run and the good state of nature materializes, higher returns in
the good state of nature can help to prevent runs and thereby default risk.
Our model also yields relevant policy implications. Most prominently, it shows
that the standard reaction of shedding risk upon entering distress may be counter-
productive and stimulate rather than prevent runs. This is true in particular for
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financial institutions, such as investment banks, that are largely funded by unin-
sured deposits (or equivalents, see Gorton and Metrick (2012)). In those scenarios,
increased risk-taking might help, but only if depositors are aware of that. In view of
implicit bail-out guarantees, regulators are unlikely to let this happen. To the extent
that they are, the observed risk-shifting upon entering distress may actually not only
benefit the shareholders, but even depositors through staving runs. The most effec-
tive way to stave runs is to beef up equity, possibly in combination with shedding
risk. However, due to debt overhang problems, this may be hard in practice, unless
a government commits to doing this. As a result, we provide additional rationale for
(implicit) bail-out guarantees to stave runs.
We contribute to several strands of literature. First and foremost, we contribute
to the literature on bank runs. This literature has typically modeled the liability side
of banks as deposits only Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Goldstein and Pauzner (2005).
As a result, depositors that do not run are residual claimants. This setup is ineffective
for investigating the effect of equity and other sources of loss absorption capacity on
the prevalence of bank runs. Interestingly, there is one paper in this literature,
Moreno and Takalo (2016), that also finds that the higher expected return that is
associated with increased risk taking may lead to reduced run risk. However, the
mechanism through which this result materializes is different. In Moreno and Takalo
(2016) depositors that do not run become residual claimants and hence benefit from
speculative returns. These speculative returns are also relevant in scenarios in which
no depositors withdraw their deposits. Moreover, in their setup, it is impossible to
analyze the effect of equity as loss absorption capacity and any interactions between
equity buffers and increased risk taking.
We also contribute to the literature on the governance role of bank run risk.
The risk of bank runs has been show to be effective in disciplining equity holders
and bank managers from embezzlement of and absconding with investment proceeds
(Calomiris and Kahn (1991)), and to stop the manager from creating hold-up problem
by renegotiating his compensation package (Diamond and Rajan (2000) and Diamond
and Rajan (2001)). Run risk has also been show to limit or prevent risk shifting by
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managers and equity holders at the expense of depositors Cheng and Milbradt (2012).
Yet, this comes at the risk of excessive premature liquidation Cheng and Milbradt
(2012), Wagner (2009). Our results show that when discipline with regards to risk
shifting is most relevant for banks, namely when capitalization ratios are high, run
risk is decreasing rather than increasing in risk taking. This result goes against the
result by Eisenbach (2017) who uses a general equilibrium model with correlated
asset returns to show that market discipline through runs is not very effective in
upturns and excessively costly in downturns. In our model runs are less likely to
materialize in downturns when capitalization ratios have suffered and are low.
Our results are unique to a Global Games implementation of bank runs. Global
Games, as developed by Morris and Shin (2006), Rochet and Vives (2004), and
Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) are a useful extension to the bank runs literature
started by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) since these models manage to obtain unique
equilibria rather than multiple equilibria. As a result, one can analyze the objective
probability of a bank run materializing. Since we link the probability of a bank run to
loss absorption capacity, we are constrained to working in a Global games framework.
3.2 Setup
In this section we outline the setup of the model. The model is very similar to
the one by Goldstein and Pauzner (2005). We extend their model in two ways: we
explicitly model equity on the balance sheet and we allow for a menu of risk choices
to the bank. For comparability, we have tried to keep notation as similar as possible
to that in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005).
3.2.1 The agents
The model is a two-period (1, 2) model that involves a continuum of depositors
and an equity holder. Abstracting from any agency problems, “the bank manager”
has her interest perfectly aligned with the equity holder thus is not modeled as a
separate agent. The capital structure of the bank is exogenous and fixed. The
shareholders contribute e ≥ 0 amount of equity, while the depositors have a total
deposit amount 1 in the bank. As a result, the balance sheet has a total size of
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e+ 1 and the leverage is ρ ≡ 1e+1 . We assume that the depositors are of mass 1 and
each of them contribute a unit amount of the deposit. The dispersed depositor base
gives rise to the possibility of runs resulting from coordination failure. We index the
depositors with i ∈ [0, 1].
Like in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), there are two types of depositors. A
fraction 0 < λ < 1 of depositors are “impatient” and the rest 1 − λ are patient.
Impatient depositors can consume c1 only in period 1 to obtain linear risk neutral
utility c1. Patient depositors can consume in either period 1 or period 2 to obtain
utility c1 + c2.
To extend the Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) setup, we include in our model an
equity holder. She can only consume in period 2. This late consumption assumption
is consistent with the low seniority of equity claims: the equity holder cannot be paid
before the patient depositors. The equity holder is risk neutral and maximizes her
expected profit.
3.2.2 The asset
The bank has access to assets that yield a higher return long run. The universe
of assets available can be thought of as a continuum of loans. At maturity, the asset
pays off 1 + µ if it is successful, and zero if it fails. The probability of success is θ.
Based on the risk return tradeoff, we further assume that assets with higher µ
are more risky: θ is drawn from a uniform distribution on [1 − µ, 1]. High values
of µ on one hand represent higher upside returns, but on the other hand represent
that the asset’s success probability can become very low. µ is the loan specific “asset
risk” that we focus on and it is exogenous. This specification of µ allows for the
consideration of risk return tradeoff of the bank assets in global game models. It
is similar to that introduced by Moreno and Takalo (2016), who investigate bank
transparency instead and do not include bank equity in their model.
The above random payoffs are generated only if the asset is held by the bank
until period 2. If instead liquidated in period 1, the asset generates instead a value
0 < l < 1.
Chapter 3. Asset risk and bank runs 7
3.2.3 The deposit contract
In period 1, each depositor i ∈ [0, 1] can choose one of the two actions: withdrawal
or rollover. If she withdraws in date 1, her contract promises gross return r1 ≥ 1.
On the other hand, if she rolls over her deposit, the contract promises the interest
rate
r1 < r2 < 1 + µ (3.1)
in period 2. The second inequality must hold, otherwise, the period 2 promised
return is so high, that even if the bank survives period 1 and the underlying project
pays off, the remaining creditor will always get the entire loan payoff, leaving the
equity holder nothing in every state of the world. We assume that both r1 and r2
are exogenous.
The return r1 or r2 is paid in full in the respective period only if the bank has
enough cash in that period. Otherwise the we refer to it as “bankruptcy”, in which
case entitled depositors receive a pro rata share of the cash that the bank has at that
moment. 1
In addition, in period 2, the depositors that did not withdraw in period 1 does
not get paid anything if the realized loan payoff is 0.
To make the problem interesting, we assume that if all depositors withdraw in
period 1, then even if the whole loan is liquidated, the liquidation proceeds are
insufficient for full repayment:
(1 + e)l < r1. (3.2)
Otherwise, bankruptcy can never happen, which removes the incentive to run.
1We’ll discuss under what circumstance the bank has or do not have enough cash for repayment
in the next subsection.
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3.2.4 The information structure
In the start of period 1, the depositors observe the innate asset risk µ of the loan.
However, they do not observe the realized repayment probability θ. Instead, at the
start of period 1, each depositor i receives an i.i.d. noisy signal θi = θ+ i of θ. The
noise i is uniformly distributed over [−, ], where  represents the precision of the
signal. Following the global game approach in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), adding
this noise allows us to pin down the unique equilibrium of this game. If there are
multiple equilibria, it is impossible to assign a probability to runs, thus impossible to
study how risk choice affect the equity holder’s profit by affecting the run probability.
Other parameters such as l and e are common knowledge throughout the game.
3.2.5 The time line
The game of this economy is set up to have two periods:
In period 1, first, the random variable θ realizes. Next, each depositor i learns
about whether she is a patient or impatient type. Then all depositors receive noisy
signals of θ and decide whether to roll over their deposits. The bank liquidates part
of or the whole loan to meet the withdrawal demand. If the liquidation proceeds
are not enough to repay everybody, the bank goes bankrupt. In that case, each
withdrawing depositor gets a pro rata share of the liquidation proceeds, whereas
those that rolled over and the equity holder gets nothing. Otherwise, the bank
carries on the investment with the non-liquidated portion of the asset, and the game
continues.
In period 2, the asset either yields a high or a zero return. The unliquidated
part of the asset pays off 1 + µ with probability θ, in which case the bank pays the
remaining depositors. Each depositor is paid r2, if the total payoff is enough to do
so, in which case the equity holder keeps the residual profit, if any. If the total payoff
is not enough to repay all remaining depositors, the bank goes bankrupt and the
depositors that did not withdraw receive pro rata shares from the final payoff.
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Figure 3.1. Model Timing
t = 1 t = 2
• The success probability θ real-
izes.
• Each depositor learns about her
own type being patient or impa-
tient.
• Each depositor receives a signal
θi of the repayment probability.
• Each depositor decides whether
she want to roll over or withdraw.
Those that withdraw gets paid.
Bankruptcy may occur, in which
case the game ends.
• The asset succeeds or fails. The
asset yields return 1 + µ with
probability θ and 0 otherwise.
The asset return is distributed to
the remaining depositors and any
remainder to the equity holder.
3.3 Bankruptcy and runs
Before defining the equilibria, we first make some preliminary analyses of the
game. In particular, we determine how the bank can go bankrupt in our setup, and
how the payoff of a depositor is affected by his rollover/withdrawal actions as well
as the bankruptcy status of the bank. These factors are crucial for the depositors
incentive to run and thus are necessary foundations of the equilibrium analysis.
In period 1, each depositor i learns about whether she is a patient or impatient
type and then observes her signal θi. Each depositor then has the option to withdraw
her deposit from the bank. Let n ≤ 1 denote the endogenous fraction of depositors
who choose to withdraw. Since the impatient depositors have to consume in period
1, it is optimal for them to withdraw in period 1 regardless of θi they observe. This
implies the following condition on n:
n ≥ λ (3.3)
In period 1, bankruptcy occurs if the fraction n of withdrawing depositors is so
large that even if the entire asset is liquidated, the proceeds are insufficient for full
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interest payment r1. Mathematically, this condition is represented by the following
condition:
(e+ 1)l < nr1 (3.4)
Condition (3.4) is equivalent to:
n > n˙ ≡ (e+ 1)l
r1
, (3.5)
where n˙ represents the critical mass that triggers period 1 bankruptcy.
Under condition (3.4), the game ends, each withdrawer gets a pro rata return
(1+e)l
n , while the depositors that choose to wait and the equity holder receive 0.
If there are fewer withdrawers than the critical fraction n˙, the bank only has to
liquidate nr1l < 1 + e amount of asset to meet the demand of the n depositors. The
rest (1 + e− nr1l ) of the asset carries on the investment and yields a random return
in period 2: the period 2 total asset payoff is (1 + µ)
(
1 + e− nr1l
)
with probability
θ and 0 otherwise.
Even if bankruptcy does not occur in period 1 and the investment continues to
period 2, the bank may still go bankrupt under two circumstances. First, period
2 bankruptcy occurs if the project underlying the asset fails. The probability of
this happening conditional on the game continuing to period 2 is 1 − θ. Second,
period 2 bankruptcy may also occur, even if the asset succeeds (with probability θ),
if sufficiently many depositors chose to withdraw in period 1. In that case, even
though period 1 withdrawals can be fully accommodated, the liquidation costs are so
large that there is insufficient value left for depositors that did not withdraw early.
(
1 + e− nr1
l
)
(1 + µ) < (1− n)r2 (3.6)
Condition (3.6) is equivalent to the following condition:
n > n˜ ≡ (1 + µ)(e+ 1)− r2(1+µ)r1
l − r2
, (3.7)
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where n˜ represents the critical mass that triggers a run-induced period 2 bankruptcy.
It can be shown that n˜ < n˙. The intuition for this is that the bank only survives till
period 2 if n is sufficiently small.
To make the analysis interesting, we assume that the fraction λ of impatient
depositors is small enough that unavoidable liquidation losses due to impatient de-
positors do not guarantee bankruptcy in period 1. The following condition ensures
this to be the case:
(1 + e)l > λr1 (3.8)
In addition, we also make an additional assumption to ensure that unavoidable liq-
uidation losses due to impatient depositors do not guarantee bankruptcy in period
1. The following condition ensures this to be the case:
(1 + µ)
(
1 + e− λr1
l
)
> (1− λ)r2 (3.9)
The left hand side of this inequality is the payoff of the remaining asset in period
2 when the project succeeds, if all patient depositors wait until period 2 instead of
withdrawing in period 1, whereas the right hand side is the promised principal plus
interest for these patient depositors that waited until period 2. 2
In case period 2 bankruptcy occurs under condition (3.6), the loan return is allo-
cated pro rata so that each remaining depositor gets (1+µ)(1+e−
nr1
l )
1−n with probability
θ while the equity holder is left with nothing. Otherwise each remaining deposi-
tor gets r2 with probability θ and the equity holder get the residual with the same
probability and nothing otherwise.
We summarize the payoff to a depositor, as functions of both her own decision
to wait/withdraw, as well as the aggregate withdrawal fraction of her peers, n in
Table 3.1.
2After algebraic transformation, assumption (3.9) can be alternatively written as: µ >
(1−λ)r2
1+e−λr1
l
− 1 ≡ µ, a condition that puts a restriction on the lower bound of µ. Assumption (3.9)
can also be re-written as: (1+µ)(e+1)−r2(1+µ)r1
l
−r2
> λ, ensuring that condition (3.3) and condition (3.7) are
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Table 3.1. Expected payoff patterns resulting from depositor withdrawal and
roll-over decisions
withdraw in period λ ≤ n ≤ n˜ n˜ < n < n˙ n˙ ≤ n ≤ 1
1 r1 r1 (e+1)ln
2 θr2 θ
(1+µ)(e+1−nr1l )
1−n 0
3.4 Equilibrium
3.4.1 The depositor’s problem
In period 2, each depositor i ∈ [0, 1] determines whether to roll over or withdraw
her deposit. Each patient depositor seeks to maximize her expected consumption
c1 + c2. Therefore it’s in her best interest to wait only if the payoff from roll over
exceeds that of withdrawal, or equivalently, the utility differential v(θ, n(θ)) between
rollover and withdrawal is positive. Based on the payoff from rollover and withdrawal
we derived in Section 3.3 and summarized in Table 3.1, v(θ, n(θ)) should have the
formula:
v(θ, n(θ)) ≡

θr2 − r1 if λ ≤ n(θ) ≤ n˜
θ
(1 + µ)
(
e+ 1− n(θ)r1l
)
(1− n(θ)) − r1 if n˜ < n(θ) < n˙
0− (e+ 1)l
n(θ) if n˙ ≤ n(θ) ≤ 1,
(3.10)
where critical values n˙ and n˜ are defined by conditions (3.5) and (3.7) respectively.
But since in our game the depositors do not observe θ or n, they are not able to
compute v(θ, n(θ)) directly to inform their decision. The best a depositor can do is
to estimate the θ and n(θ) based on her signal θi and compute the expected value of
v(θ, n(θ)) accordingly:
∆(θi) ≡ E
(
v(θ, n(θ))|θi
)
(3.11)
not redundant.
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Then she rolls over if and only if ∆(θi) is positive.
The next step of the thought process of any depositor is to have an idea of the
decision rule of all other depositors, so that she knows the functional form of n(θ) in
terms of θ. We address this problem now in the Subsection 3.4.2.
3.4.2 Equilibrium definition
In this paper, we restrict attention to a special type of equilibria: the ones in
which the decision rules of the depositors are “threshold strategy”: each depositor
i withdraws whenever her signal is lower than a certain threshold θ∗i , and roll over
if the signal is higher than this threshold. A threshold strategy is consistent with
the behavior of depositors in the real world: they tend to withdraw their deposit if
they believe the chance of asset success is low enough, and will also withdraw if their
belief of the success probability is even lower.
In addition, since depositors are ex ante identical, we only consider symmetric
equilibria in which they apply the same threshold: θ∗i ≡ θ∗ for any i ∈ [0, 1].
In summary, we define the equilibrium as:
Definition 5 A symmetric, threshold equilibrium of the game is characterized by a
run threshold θ∗ of the depositors, such that, in period 2, if all other depositors apply
the threshold θ∗, depositor i also find it optimal to also apply threshold θ∗, in the
sense of maximizing E
(
v(θ, n(θ))|θi
)
.
3.4.3 Equilibrium uniqueness
As can be seen from Subsection 3.4.1 that the signal θi is informative to depositor
i in two ways: not only does it inform the depositor about the probability of asset
successful, but also allows her to refine her expectation of the distribution of the
other depositors’ signals, thereby inferring the fraction of withdrawers n(θi).
Similar to Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), we assume that there exist extremely
good (bad) states of θ, such that it is optimal for depositors to wait (withdraw),
respectively, based on the good (bad) probability alone, regardless of what other
depositors do. We term the regions of such extremely bad and extremely good states
“upper (lower) dominance region”.
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“Upper dominance region” is the range of θ such that the asset prospect is so good
such that no depositor would withdraw even if all other fellow depositors withdraw.
Similar to Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), we construct this region by assuming that
for any θ ≥ θ¯ ≡ 1 − 3, such that for any θ ∈ [θ¯, 1], the asset success probability
is 1, and the asset generate its return 1 + µ in period 1 instead of period 2. In
other words, when θ ≥ θ¯, to meet interim withdrawal demand, instead of having to
liquidate part of the long term asset for repayment, the bank can instead satisfy the
redemption request with the asset return that has been delivered ahead of schedule.
These extra assumptions can be interpreted that assets with high success probability
tend to mature earlier as well. This construction underlies the proof of equilibrium
uniqueness in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005).
Under these added assumptions, when θ¯ + 2 ≤ θ < 1, then for any depositor
i, her signal θi > θ¯ + . As a result of her knowledge of the size of the noise, she
knows that θ has to be bigger than θ¯. Consequently, even if all the other depositors
withdraw in period 1, depositor i believes there is still (1 + µ)(1 + e) − r1 amount
of cash left, which by assumption 3.1 is more than (r2 − r1)(1 + e). Considering her
own infinite small size, this amount is more enough to repay depositor i with r2 if
she choose to wait. Therefore indeed waiting is a dominant action of hers regardless
of the actions of everybody else. Recall that this argument holds for any depositor i.
Thus under these assumptions, all depositors would choose to wait when θ > θ¯+ 2.
Though the existence of a neighborhood [θ¯, 1] is necessary for the proof of equi-
librium uniqueness3, the size of this neighborhood can be infinitely small as the noise
in the signal vanishes (→ 0), since θ¯ ≡ 1− 3. Hence, we can come arbitrarily close
to a setting with perfect information. As a result, when computing the equilibrium
quantities and comparative statics, we do not have to worry about the complica-
tions introduced by this assumption. All the results obtained from Section 3.3 and
Subsection 3.4.1 still apply.
Similarly, “lower dominance region” is the range of θ such that the asset prospect
is so bad such that every depositor would withdraw even if all other fellow depositors
3Goldstein and Pauzner (2005)’s argument
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wait. This regions is constructed by finding a θ, such that if a depositor i believes
that θ ≤ θ with certainty, then she would withdraw in period 1 even if all other
depositors choose to wait. We found this θ as:
θ ≡ r1
r2
(3.12)
When a depositor believes that θ ≤ θ, she realizes that even if everybody else
wait, the payoff of herself waiting is θr2 ≤ θr2 = r1, but the payoff of withdrawing r1
dominates waiting. To convince her that θ ≤ θ for sure, her signal must be θi ≤ θ−.
And to make sure all depositors receive such signals, the realized state θ must satisfy:
θ ≤ θ − 2. However, recall that by our setup, θ ∈ [1 − µ, 1], thus to ensure such θ
exists, we need the assumption that:
1− µ ≤ r1
r2
− 2. (3.13)
This assumption puts a upper bound on the values of µ.
With the additional assumptions that allow for the construction of the upper and
lower dominance region, there exists a unique symmetric threshold equilibrium.
Proposition 4 This game has a unique symmetric threshold equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix. 
From now on we write the unique common threshold of patient depositors as θ∗.
Now that we have proved the equilibrium uniqueness, we can derive outcome variables
as a function of θ∗ and be sure that they have unique values. For example, for each
realization of the state variable θ, we can compute the fraction n of withdrawers by:
n(θ, θ∗) = λ+ (1− λ) · prob[θ + i < θ∗] (3.14)
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Since i is uniformly distributed on the interval [−, ], n can be evaluated ac-
cording to the following corollary:
Corollary 6 Given asset risk µ and equity e, the proportion of agents that withdraw
before maturity depends only on the realized state of the asset’s prospect. It is in the
form:
n(θ, θ∗(e, µ)) =

1 if θ < θ∗ − 
λ+ (1− λ) min
((
1
2 +
θ∗(e, µ)− θ
2
)
, 1
)
if θ∗ −  ≤ θ ≤ θ∗ + 
λ if θ > θ∗ + 
(3.15)
From this point on, like in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), we derive most of
our results at the limit when  → 0. As  → 0, by construction θ¯ → 1, thus the
irregularities of the θ value and the payoff vanish as well, which allows us to use the
preliminaries derived in Section 3.3 and Subsection 3.4.1 for our derivations from this
point on.
Since we are interested in how asset risk µ affect the probability of bankruptcy
of period 1 and period 2, first derive an analytical expression for the probability
of bankruptcy pi. Similar to Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), the run probability is
intricately related to the equilibrium threshold θ∗(e, µ). Therefore, we first give the
analytical form of θ∗(e, µ).
Lemma 7 As the error in signal  vanishes, equilibrium threshold has the formula:
θ∗ →0−−−→ lk(e)
z(e, µ) , (3.16)
where to condense the notation, functions k(e) and z(e, µ) are explicit functional
forms of the parameters defined as:
k(e) ≡ l(e+ 1)
(
1− log
(
l(e+ 1)
r1
))
− λr1 (3.17)
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and
z(µ, e) ≡ − (r1 − l(e+ 1)) (µ+ 1) log( (µ+ 1)r1(µ+ 1)r1 − lr2
)
+ (1− λ) lr2 (3.18)
Proof. See Appendix. 
In Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), the equilibrium threshold is the probability of
bankruptcy. That is because state variable θ is uniformly distributed on interval
[0, 1]. But θ in our paper is uniformly distributed on [1− µ, 1] instead, so we need a
minor algebraic modification of θ∗ to obtain the probability of bankruptcy.
As discussed earlier, the bank in our model can go bankruptcy in either period 1
or period 2. The question is Which probability to consider? It turns out that this is
a non-issue, because the two probabilities converge as the signal noise vanishes.
Lemma 8 As the error in signal  vanishes, the probability that the bank goes bankrupt
in period 1 is the same as the probability that it goes bankrupt in period 2. This unique
probability, named pi has the form:
pi ≡ prob(θ ≤ θ∗) →0−−−→
lk(e)
z(e,µ) − 1 + µ
µ
, (3.19)
Proof. See Appendix. 
The intuition behind the coincidence of period 1 and period 2 bankruptcy prob-
ability is that, as the depositors get infinitely accurate information, they would pre-
emptively withdraw in period 1 once they learn that bank will go bankrupt in period
2, leading to period 1 bankruptcy. They are not able to do this when the signal is
noisy enough, since in that case the depositors that received signal with positively
biased noise would not believe that the bankruptcy will occur in period 2, and even
the depositors that receive a signal that happens to be the same as the true θ are not
sure about the signal either. In summary, the noise put a damper on the preemptive
withdrawal in period 1. In light of this result, from now on, we refer to period 1
and period 2 bankruptcy collectively as “bank runs”, and pi is the “run probability”.
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One should notice that since most other bank run models do not feature equity, but
have non-withdrawing depositors as the residual claimants, this result is unique to
our setting.
3.5 Comparative statics
Taking derivative of the equilibrium run probability pi with respective to the loss
absorption capital e and risk profile µ allows us to investigate how the likelihood of
runs change with respect to these two parameters.
First we derive how equity buffers affect the run probability pi. As one might
expect, the the larger the capital buffer, the less likely the runs, since equity reduces
the likelihood of run-induced defaults in period 2 and thereby mitigates the incentive
to run.
Proposition 5 As → 0, run probability pi strictly decreases in capital amount e
Proof. See Appendix. 
We then continue by deriving the main result of our paper concerning the com-
parative static of the run probability with respect to the asset risk.
Since pi is a function of the run threshold θ∗, we first derive the sensitivity of θ∗
with respect to µ:
Lemma 9
d
dµθ
∗(µ) < 0 (3.20)
Proof. See Appendix. 
The intuition for this result is as follows. µ affects the threshold θ∗ via two
channels. On one hand, a larger µ is destabilizing, that is, it leads to higher θ∗.
This is because it heighten the tipping point withdrawer fraction n˜ above which the
bank becomes insolvent in period 2 thereby those that wait receive payoff less than
the promised r2, making runs more likely. On the other hand, increasing µ can
also discourage runs by increasing the payoff to those that wait when the bank goes
bankrupt in period 2: (1+e−
nr1
l )(1+µ)
1−n . This positive effect is due to the period 2 payoff
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when the asset payoff is not enough to pay r2, and the depositor effectively becomes
the residual claimant. Since any increase in period 2 payoff would lead to fewer runs,
this second channel is a stabilizing effect of higher asset risk. Lemma 9 demonstrates
that overall this stabilizing effect is larger in magnitude than the destabilizing effect
mentioned earlier in this paragraph.
But this is only one side of the coin. Note that θ∗ does not capture all the negative
effects of higher asset risk. High asset risk means that the lower bound of the bad
states θ is lower, as θ ∈ [1−µ, 1], and hence, there would be more scenarios in which
the asset payoff equals zero. This effect is captured by pi, as can be seen from the
−(1 − µ) term in the numerator in formula (3.19). To weigh the cost of high risk
against the benefit of high return in the good state, we analyze the mathematical
form of the derivative of pi with respect to µ. It turns out that when equity e is low
enough, the stabilizing effect dominates; higher asset risk can in fact lead to less runs.
The reason is that when equity is very low, the marginal benefit of an additional unit
of period 2 loss absorption capacity (provided by higher good state returns) is very
high and exceeds the negative effect of a high propensity of states with zero payoff.
Proposition 6 As → 0, there exists an upper bound of capital level e¯(µ), such that,
for any e ∈
(
λr1
l − 1, e¯
)
, run probability pi decreases in asset risk µ. In particular,
such relationship may occur for µ > 12
Proof. See Appendix. 
The interpretation of this result on a more detailed level is as follows. The sign of
∂pi
∂µ depends on whether the stabilizing effect of higher µ, represented by the first term
in the formula of pi dominates the destabilizing effect, represented by the second term.
Let us first look at the first term. As discussed earlier, higher µ stands for both higher
failure risk and higher period 2 returns in case of success. Higher equity level, on the
other hand, indicates that equity holders provide insurance for the depositors. Thus
higher e and the higher conditional return aspect of higher µ substitute each other
in attracting the depositors to wait until asset maturity. This is why the sensitivity
of the first term, θ∗, to µ can get very big when e is smaller. The second term of pi
representing the destabilizing effect, however, is not a function of e thus its negative
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effect turns out be offset by the stabilizing effect when e is small enough.
It is important to note that this interesting result may occur for µ > 12 . One can
show that the socially optimal risk choice equals 12 .4 When µ >
1
2 , aggregate welfare
decreases in µ, meaning that the asset starts to become negative marginal NPV, if
µ increases further. So this aspect means that run probability may decrease in asset
risk, and consequently runs may encourage risk taking, even when such risk taking
is NPV destroying.
4One would need to maximize (1 + µ)(1− 12µ)
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Chapter 4
CEO evaluation frequencies and innovation
Abstract
I focus on an important aspect of corporate governance that has been challenging to
empirically identify – the frequency at which the CEO performance is evaluated by
the shareholders. Because trial and error is a time-consuming process but is crucial
to produce important innovations, evaluation frequency is an important determinant
of innovation, an insight provided by Manso (2011). Taking advantage of the 2011
SEC rule change that requires all public US companies to vote on the “say on pay”
frequency, I apply sharp regression discontinuity design (RDD) to show that firms
with less frequent evaluations generate more innovation in the long run. Further-
more, my evidence suggests that the underlying mechanism is that low evaluation
frequency allow costly “explorations” in a broad spectrum of technological fields in
the beginning. Later on, the firm benefits from the exploration by “exploiting” the
knowledge acquired during exploration, as shown by my results. The patent “trun-
cation problems” that traditionally limit investigations of recent (here 2011 onward)
innovation are ameliorated by the collection and usage of patent application data.
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4.1 Introduction
Corporate governance has first order effect on firm innovation. This notion is
supported by evidence in various contexts1, and underlies the JOBS (Jumpstart Our
Business Startups) Act. Among various aspects of corporate governance, CEO per-
formance evaluation frequency is of particular importance, as predicted by theories.
Stein (1988) points out that the short term performance pressure resulted from very
frequent evaluations may result in CEO Short-Termism, including the abandonment
of innovation. Recently, Manso (2011) shows that the incentive scheme that best mo-
tivates innovation tolerates short term failure and rewards long term success. High
value innovation is often accompanied by great uncertainty. Its completion requires
“exploration” as the first stage, which serves to acquire intellectual capital but does
not generate measurable short term performance. Its great benefit is actualized in
the “exploitation” stage when the firm is able to produce tangible innovation out-
puts (patents, etc.). But when the evaluation frequency (inverse of the “frequency”
introduced above) is too high, the shareholders of the firm are unable to determine
whether the temporary lack of performance is the result of exploration or shirking.
In equilibrium, the friction caused by the short term shareholders oversight may dis-
courage the CEO from exploring, which means the firm is unable to pursue high
value innovation. The competing “quiet life theory”2 by Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2003) makes the effect of evaluation frequency on innovation ultimately an empirical
question. But so far it has been difficult to measure let alone identify the evaluation
frequency directly3. The lack of direct evidence makes the impact of evaluation fre-
quency on innovation controversial. For example, this issue is a subject of debate in
the 2016 US presidential election4.
1Notable examples are Seru (2014) and Bernstein (2015).
2Without short term evaluation the CEO would simply shirk and not innovate.
3Natural experiments usually generate exogenous variations in the intensity of governance but
rarely in the time length of evaluation frequency. The closest proxy for the evaluation frequency
have been active institutional ownership and public ownership in general. But these proxies are not
able to exclude channels other than the frequency effect. The empirical studies on this issue are
reviewed by Kerr and Nanda (2014) and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2014).
4For two opposing views expressed in the Wall Street Journals, see: “The Imaginary Problem of
Corporate Short-Termism.” (Roe (2015)) and “Clinton Gets It Right on Short-Termism.”(Galston
(2015))
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In this study, I identify the CEO evaluation frequency by exploring a unique
SEC rule change made in 2011. All public firms in the US were required to hold
a shareholder vote in 2011 on the frequency of the“say on pay”(SOP) votes. The
outcome of this vote determined how frequently the shareholders would discuss and
vote to approve/disapprove the executive compensation proposal. To identify the
causal effect of interest, I apply regression discontinuity design (RDD) to compare
firms whose shareholders voted for a lower frequency of SOP by a small margin to
those that voted for a higher frequency by a small margin. Therefore the firms that lie
close to either side of the vote share threshold can be considered identical in all aspects
but the choice of the evaluation frequencies. I use SOP as a proxy for corporate
governance in general because its effect extends beyond executive compensation.
The SOP usually occurs as the last session of the shareholder annual meetings, by
which time the shareholders have heard all items on the agenda and can use the
SOP as a tool to punish or reward the CEO for all governance issues. As a result,
CEOs of the companies that determined to hold such votes once every three years
can be considered evaluated less frequently than those that do the votes every year.
Furthermore, unlike most other shareholder votes, the vote on SOP frequency is not
manipulated by the management. In addition, it is implemented 99.7% of the time
in my sample. These two features allow for a clean sharp regression discontinuity
design (RDD), eliminating concerns of endogeneity.
To address a long lasting challenge in the measurement of innovation, I apply a
new methodology and collect new data. Previously, due to “truncation problems”
with the patent data, researchers have only been able to evaluate an innovation at
least 10 years after the patent is granted (Lerner and Seru (2015)). An analogous
problem is also found in the academic publication process. When evaluating a re-
searcher’s recent productivity, one counts not only his published articles, but also his
pre-publication working papers, since most of his recent work is still in this stage.
Similarly, the pre-grant patent application data is crucial in the case of corporate
innovation. However, it has not been collected into one database or matched with
company identifiers such as CUSIPs. This makes timely (here, a shock in 2011) eval-
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uation of innovation difficult. Thus, I collect patent application data via large scale
data collecting and show through backtesting that by adding the application data, I
am able to evaluate innovations as recent as three years with accuracy and precision.
I assemble a sample of 2247 firms that held the say on pay frequency vote and
have patenting activities. In 2011, all the firms held5 the SOP frequency vote in
their annual meeting to determine the voting frequency of the SOPs. The options
given by the SEC were either “every year” (“distracted firms”) or “once every three
years” (“undistracted firms”). The first installment of the SOP was held in 2011, and
the second installment was to occur in 2012 for the distracted firms and in 2014 for
the undistracted firms. Thus, the undistracted firms had a three-year undistracted
period from 2011 to 2014, while the distracted firms did not. I apply RDD by
comparing the innovation of these two groups of firms year by year throughout the
undistracted period (2011 to 2014) for the undistracted firms. Any difference in
innovation between these two groups during these years is a result of their different
evaluation frequency (one year versus three years).
Consistent with the predictions made by Manso (2011), I find a dynamic rela-
tionship between the frequency of SOP voting and the value of innovation outputs.
The undistracted firms produce patents at similar quantities and scientific values
(measured by the number of citations received) in the first year of the undistracted
period, but in the third year, this trend is reversed. Indeed, at this point in the
undistracted period, the undistracted firms apply for more patents that garner more
citations in the following 4 years than the distracted firms. Therefore in the end, the
undistracted firms surpass the distracted firms, and this does not take into account
the potentially greater benefits it may experience after the three year period. These
results suggest that having the SOP meeting less frequently leads firms to make more
valuable innovations in the long run.
What leads to this dynamic effect? To shed light on the underlying mechanism,
I compare the firms’ emphasis on exploration versus exploitation year by year. I
find that in the first year, the undistracted firms are more likely to explore less
5A small number of firms held it in 2013. I will discuss this in detail in section 4.3.
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familiar technological fields, measured by the “Exploitation Index” as well as the
Herfendahl diversity of the cited fields (measures proposed by Trajtenberg et al.
(1997)). This result suggests that without short term pressure, firms are able to
spend time exploring technological fields that they have less expertise in previously.
Taken together with the previous results, these initial exploration may explain the
increased ability of the undistracted firms to produce more valuable patents over the
years. It also confirms the empirical prediction by Manso (2011) that suggests that
exploration manifests its benefit only in the long term and is tolerated only by firms
with low evaluation frequencies. What is more, the possible change of technological
focus suggests a intrafirm Schumpeterian creative destruction, which on aggregate
leads to progress in technology.
As already explained throughout the above text, this paper makes two contri-
butions. Not only is it the first study to empirically identify the causality of CEO
evaluation frequency on innovation, but it develops a new data set and methodology
to enable the study of recent innovations.
This paper relates to three strands of literature. First, it joins the debate on the
role of corporate governance and ownership structure in innovation. The empirical
evidence on this issue is divided. For example, Atanassov (2013) finds that innovation
falls in the states that pass antitakeover laws while Chemmanur and Tian (2018) find
that innovation is higher in firms with more antitakeover defenses. Similarly, Acharya
and Krishnamurthy (2009) find that lenient bankruptcy laws promote innovation,
suggestive of a greater willingness to take on risky projects with stronger downside
protection. However, Mann (2018) finds that stronger creditor rights are associated
with greater innovation by firms in his sample. My findings establish that the effect
of corporate governance depends on the evaluation frequency.
In particular, it fills the gap between the theoretical and empirical works on the
relationship between CEO incentives and firm innovation. As predicted by Manso
(2011), there are two necessary conditions of CEO incentive structure that stimulate
innovation: short term tolerance of failure and long term reward for success. With-
out the tolerance for early failure, CEOs do not make risky but potentially valuable
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innovations, without reward for long-term success, CEOs will not have an incentive
to innovate and simply shirk. Thus it is important to test both of them simultane-
ously. Gonzalez-Uribe and Xu (2017) look at the impact of CEO contract length on
innovation, which only captures short term tolerance for failure but not long term
reward for success. A CEO’s job is secure for the length of her contract, but the
tenure itself is not designed to provide rewards for potential success. In my setup,
however, these two necessary conditions can be tested together. Low say on pay
frequency is a commitment not to cut the pay in case of short term failure, whereas
say on pay itself serves as a tool to effectively increase the pay of the CEO in case of
long term success, by approving the proposal for a raise.
Second, with regards to the underlying mechanism of this differing effect, this
study relates to the literature on the trade-off between two types of innovations: ex-
ploration and exploitation. Exploration refers to the process in which the innovator
experiments with various potential fields or strategies to identify the most promising
one. In contrast, exploitations build on the expertise and knowledge acquired from
explorations. Recent findings highlight the important role of exploration in generat-
ing fundamental innovations. (Kerr et al. (2014) and Manso (2011)) In particular, the
theoretical model proposed by Manso (2011) predicts that the most effective contract
to motivate innovation tolerates short term failures and rewards long term success.
This study tests this prediction with rich dynamism enabled by novel measures of
exploration and the time length specific identification strategy.
Third, by using say on pay as a proxy for corporate governance, this paper relates
to the literature of the effect of say on pay votes. For example, Cun˜at et al. (2012)
uses RDD to study the stock market reactions to say on pay vote results. In contrast,
my study is about the vote on SOP frequency not SOP vote itself. The variation
in frequency is necessary to identify the governance horizon. I also supplement this
literature by revealing dynamic actions the firms take between two consecutive SOPs.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 describes the data and
measures. Section 4.3 demonstrates the validity of the identification strategy. Section
4.4 provides the main results. Section 4.5 reports the robustness tests conducted.
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Section 4.6 discusses the main limitations of this paper. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Data and measures
4.2.1 Patent Data
4.2.1.1 Truncation problems with the patent data
This paper introduces the usage of patent application data into the study of cor-
porate innovation. Traditionally, researchers have relied only on granted patent data.
But due to “truncation problems” inherent in this data, a firm’s innovation output
can only be assessed 10 years after it is produced which makes it impossible to eval-
uate impacts of recent events affecting innovation. With the addition of application
data, however, I show that innovation can be measured with reasonable accuracy,
even for events that have occurred as recent as 2013. In this section, I will explain
what I mean by “truncation problems” and describe how patent application data can
solve them.
The formal patenting process begins with the filing of an application. Patent
status is awarded or denied based on an investigation into the originality of the in-
vention, which takes 34 months on average. Because of this extended processing
time, a company’s most recent inventions typically remain in the application stage
and do not appear in the patent database. In this sense, the patent count, which
represents a company’s innovation, appears truncated in the database, as demon-
strated by the left panel of figure C.3. In the figure, the x-axis represents the year
in question and the y-axis the average number of patents per firm that were applied
in the year in question and granted by the end time of the database. The red dots
represent the number of patents counted in 2006, whereas the black dots represent
the patents counted in 2016. Hall et al. (2005) demonstrate that inventions that are
granted patent status receive their status within ten years after the initial applica-
tion. Therefore for the same firm at the same filing year, the black line represents
the eventual accurate patent count, whereas the red line represents what researchers
could construct with data available in 2006. The widening gap between the two
plots appears as if the firms’ innovative activities declined as the sampling period
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came to an end, but this truncation is actually an artifact. The company’s recent
patent patent applications have not been granted patent status yet, and thus are not
collected by the patent database.
A related truncation problem exists in regards to citations that a patent receives,
which are often used as a measure of the scientific value of the patent. Patents garner
citations over time, and a large number of citations they receive in the patent’s infancy
come from other applications that have not been awarded patent status; though,
citations are also received from other patents. In addition, a patent starts to receive
citations when it is still an “application”, from both other applications and other
patents. In total, there are four sources of citations that a firm’s inventions receive
in a certain year (Figure C.2), but without the application data, researchers are only
able to observe those from the first source (arrowhead A). This is especially an issue
for the recent innovative activities, since most of the innovation outputs are still in
the “application” stage thus missing from the database. The right panel of Figure
C.3 illustrates the truncation problem with the citations. One can control for the
time fixed effect to eliminate resulted biases, but the small number of citations and
patents counted make the measurement very noisy. Traditionally, researches have
waited at least 10 years after a patent application was filed to assess its importance,
by which time the small sample problem has been compensated by the accumulated
citations over the years.
4.2.1.2 Adding the application data
There are two challenges in using the application data. First, the application
filings warehoused by Google Patents were in the form of around six million individual
webpages rather than one dataset, and the company names, if provided, are not
standardized and may include typos. For example, the company “Hewlett-Packard”
has as many as 34 name variants, including “HP”, “HP INC.” and “Hewett-Packerd”.
Second, these patents are not matched with company identifiers such as the CUSIP,
making it difficult to merge them with financial databases.
I overcome these challenges using Python scripts to perform web crawling to ob-
tain patent and application information. I then match the names with CUSIPs using
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the pre-existing matches provided by the NBER patent database (constructed by
Hall et al. (2005)), assisted by the disambiguation dataset provided by PatentsView.
I also use manual matching to overcome incomplete names from the patent database.
Further details on the process are described in the appendix.
To confirm that the added application data allows me to accurately measure recent
innovation, I conducted “backtesting”. This methodology has been used primarily in
asset pricing studies to test whether an investment strategy will be profitable in the
future by assessing whether it would have been profitable had it been applied in the
past. An important caveat lies in that the only information that can be used in the
testing is the information available at the time the testing is intended to emulate.
I use the same principle to conduct backtesting of the innovation measures in three
steps. First, for all the firms, for the years 2001−2006, I construct measures both with
the application data (the “supplemented measure”) and without (the “raw measure”).
Additionally, only the information available in 2006 was used. In other words, any
application that was granted after 2006 is counted as an application rather than a
patent. Similarly, any citations that occurred after 2006 are not counted. Then for
the same firms of the same years (2001− 2006), I construct the innovation measures
using only patent data, but using the information that is available as of 2016. In other
words, I count the applications that eventually get patent status as well as citations
these patents received after 2006. The measure constructed in this step, which allows
for a 10-year accumulation period is what have been used in the literature. It has
the disadvantage of a long wait, but should be precise and accurate. Thus it serves
as the benchmark against which the supplemented and raw measures are evaluated.
Finally I compute the Pearson correlation coefficients between the supplemented and
raw measures and this benchmark. The difference between these two correlations
signifies how accurate the supplemented measure (including the application data) is
compared to the raw measure (without the application data) that this paper creates
is relative to the raw measure. If this advantage is big enough, we can be confident
to extrapolate that, the supplemented measures that I compute for the year 2011,
with the data available as of 2016, accurately predict the citations and patent counts
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that this firm will receive in the long run, say, by 2026.
The backtesting shows that the supplemented measure computed with the added
application data features less bias and less noise compared to the raw measurement
that does not include application data. This improvement in accuracy is demon-
strated in Figure C.4 by the alleviated truncations (green dots) for both patent counts
(upper panel) and citation counts (lower panel), relative to their raw counterparts
(red dots). Aside from accuracy, the assessment of precision is reported in Table C.1,
which tabulates the Pearson correlation coefficients between the two tested measures
and the benchmark. As the literature rightly worries, the raw measure correlates
poorly with the true value when the patent is very recent, which is represented by its
low correlation with the true value for all five tested years, especially the last three.
In contrast, the supplemented measures correlate very well with the benchmark, es-
pecially for the first three years. Repeating this backtesting with information sets
available in 2007, ..., 2015 respectively (results not shown), it can be shown that the
“complete measure” computed for the 2001 − 2003 using the information available
as of 2006 is as accurate as the raw measure computed as late as 2011. This makes
us confident that the supplemented measures computed in this paper for the years
2010− 2013 is accurate. The measure for 2014 is noisier but still would have a high
accuracy.
4.2.2 Measures of innovation
In this subsection I describe rigorously how the supplemented measures are com-
puted with the added application data, and why they are less biased and less noisy.
4.2.2.1 “Supplemented measures” of patent counts and patent citations
Before explaining these two supplemented measures, I first describe the measures
that have been used in the literature, which I refer to as the “raw measures”. These
measures are precise only when they are computed for patents and applications filed
at least 10 years before the end of the sample period of a studyLerner and Seru (2015).
They serve as the benchmark to which the supplemented measures are compared and
contrasted.
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“Raw patent count” Pj,t is simply the total number of patents that firm j filed
in year t, that are granted patent status as of year T , the last year of the available
patent data:
Pj,t ≡
∑
p∈Pj,t
1 (3.1)
,where Pj,t represents the set of granted patents that firm j filed in year t 6. This
measure has been used to represent the quantity of the innovation output that a firm
produces in a certain year. But, it suffers from the truncation problem, since as t is
very close to the end of the sample period T , most patents are still at the stage of
“applications”, and are thus accounted for by this measure.
“Raw average citation count” C¯P,Pj,t is the average normalized number of citations
that each patent in Pj,t receives from other granted patents as of the end of the
sampling period T :
C¯P,Pj,t ≡
∑
p∈Pj,t
CP,Pp
C¯P,P
f,t
Pj,t
(3.2)
, where “P, P” super scripts represent the fact that the citations counted are only
those from granted patents to granted patents. Thus, CP,Pp represents the citations
that patent p receives from other patents. C¯P,Pf,t represents the average number of
citations that are received by other patents filed in the same technological field in the
same year. The division by this cohort average serves to control for the substantial
cross field and time series variation of the patent citations Lerner and Seru (2015).
As alluded to in the previous section, the patent-to-patent citations counted by
this measure only account for one of the four types of citations, which is represented
by the A type in Figure C.2. As t approaches the end of the sampling period, most
of the patents are still applications, which results in this measure ignoring a large
6In this paper, I use “Holy Roman bold” font to represent sets.
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part of total citations.
In summary, since they are constructed using only the patent data, the raw
measures suffer from small sample problems when constructed for recent patent and
applications, and this reduces the measure’s statistical precision.
Because of the limitation inherent in using only patent data, I add application
data to my analytic repertoire. However, patent applications should not be given
the same weight as granted patents in quantifying innovation. After all, only 56% of
all applications are eventually granted patent status. This implies that on average,
applications are of less value than granted patents. Thus, to the extent that the
number of eventually granted patents is the most accurate measure of innovation, the
supplemented measure would generate a positive bias if the applications were used
without any discount. This is analogous to the fact that when evaluating someone’s
research output, her working paper is less of a signal than her published papers,
ceteris paribus.
To implement this discount to the applications, I derive the “application discount
factor” βτ,f . It is the conditional probability that any patent application that hasn’t
been approved in τ years will be approved eventually. It is estimated by:
βf,τ = Pr(A ∪B|A¯ ) = Pr(B)1− Pr(A ) (3.3)
=
∑∞
l=τ+1 g
f
L˜
(l)
1−∑τl=0 gfL˜(l) (3.4)
, whereA ,B and C represent three disjoint events. A is that a patent application
filed in year t would be approved as of year T , B is that it would be approved after
year T , and C is that it would never be approved eventually. Thus by Bayes’ rule,
formula 3.3 represents the conditional probability that any patent application that
hasn’t been approved in τ years will be approved eventually. This probability is
estimated by formula 3.4, where gf (l) is the number of patents in technological field
f that are granted l years after the application was filed. The estimation assumes
different application-grant lag distribution for patents in different technological field,
a phenomenon reported in Hall et al. (2005). Any patent that shows up in the patent
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database must have been approved prior to T , then by this formula, it has a discount
factor that equals 1.
With the discount factors applied to applications, I am able to compute the
unbiased supplemented version of the two raw measures.
The supplemented measure for patent count is defined as the total number of
patents and applications a firm j filed in year t, with the applications discounted:
PAj,t ≡
∑
p∈Pj,t
1 +
∑
a∈Aj,t
βF(a),t (3.5)
= Pj,t︸︷︷︸
+
∑
a∈Aj,t
βF(a),t︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3.6)
raw discounted
patent application
count count
,where F(a) is the technological field to which the application a belongs 7. Aj,t
is the set of applications filed by firm j in year t but have not been approved as of
T . Each application is not counted as one like the patents, but is discounted by the
probability (βF(a),t) that it will eventually turn into a patent, given that it hasn’t
made it as of T . As a result, it can be shown that this measure converges to the
benchmark. In contrast, the raw measures would underestimate the benchmark for
recent patents because it is composed only of the first term in formula 3.6. The undis-
counted supplemented measure, on the other hand, would overestimate it because
it does not apply the discount factors that are smaller than one. This convergence
translates into the accuracy of the supplemented measure that has been illustrated
in Figure C.3.
The “supplemented average citation count measure” is defined as the average
number of citations made to each patent or application that a firm filed at year t,
normalized by the mean citations to other patents or applications in the same cohort:
7In this paper, upright bold letters represent operators that take a patent or an application as
the argument, and generate a certain characteristic of that patent or application.
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C¯j,t ≡ 1
PAj,t

∑
p∈Pj,t
CP,Pp
C¯P,PF(p),t︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡C¯P,P
j,t
; A
+
∑
p∈Pj,t
βF(c),T(c)C
P,A
p
C¯P,AF(p),t︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
+
∑
a∈Aj,t
βF(a),t
CA,Pa
C¯A,PF(a),t︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
+
∑
a∈Aj,t
βF(a),t
βF(c),T(c)C
A,A
a
C¯A,AF(a),t︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
 (3.7)
Similar to the supplemented measure for patent count, this measure can be shown
to converge with the “long waited measure for patent count”. In contrast, the raw
measures would underestimate the “long waited measure” for recent patents, because
it is composed only of the term A in formula 3.7. The terms B, C, and D correspond
to the other three sources of citations in Figure C.2 that are not utilized in the
raw measure. The undiscounted supplemented measure, on the other hand, would
overestimate it because it doesn’t apply the discount factors that are smaller than
one. This convergence translates into the accuracy of the supplemented measure
illustrated in Figure C.3.
4.2.2.2 Measures to differentiate exploration and exploitation
In the innovation literature, exploration usually refers to the endeavor of exploring
an area new to the innovator. I identify the intellectual heritage of a patents by the
citation it gives to previously granted patents, as patent citations have been shown
to represent knowledge flow (Jaffe et al. (2000)). Just like academic papers have to
cite previous papers that built the base of the field, patents give citations to previous
patents that laid the foundation for the technological field. In my data, for each
patent, we can identify which previous patents it has cited. In addition, we can
identify the technological fields of each of the cited patents, as well as the patent
in question. As a result, for any patent, I am able to compute its “Exploitation
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Index” (EI)8 as how many of its citations are given to existing patents that are in
the same technological field as that of itself. The less a patent cites previous work
of the same field, the more it is exploring innovative areas. For example, the first
patent ever filed for electric cars probably cited a large number of patents in the field
of electric generator while the patent in question is in the field of motor vehicle itself.
This patent would have a low exploitation index by our definition above. We then
compute the average of the EI of all patents a firm files in a certain year to represent
how (not) explorative that firm is in that year.
While the EI measures the intellectual proximity of a patent to its predecessors,
another important aspect of exploration is how many different fields the firm in
question have synthesized to produce a certain patent. Highly innovative patents
are usually build on previous works of more than one field. As a result, the more
aggressive a company is exploring, the more diverse it patents citations are. Therefore
the second measure for exploration is the diversity of technological fields to which a
patent gives citations in year t 9:
Herfj = 1−
7∑
f=1
θ2f,j (3.8)
where f = 1, 2, ..., 7 is the seven-category division of technological fields proposed
by Hall et al. (2001). This categorization has been shown in the literature to capture
the bulk of cross field variations in patenting activities. Since for each patent j, I can
identify which previous patents it has cited as well as the technological fields of each
of the cited patents, I am able to measure the technological diversity of the patents
that patent j, represented by θf,j . The value of this measure increases as the fields a
firm engages in get more diversified. Similar to the treatment to EI discussed above,
I then compute the average of the Herfj of all patents a firm files in a certain year
to represent how (not) explorative that firm is in that year.
8This measure was proposed by Trajtenberg et al. (1997).
9This measure was also proposed by Trajtenberg et al. (1997).
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4.2.3 Voting data
Implemented in the spirit of the Dodd-Frank Act, on Jan. 25th., 2011, the SEC
issued a new rule requiring that all reporting companies have their shareholders
vote on the frequency of the “say on pay” (SOP) meetings to be held in the future.
The outcome of this vote determines how frequent the Say On Pay votes are to
be held in the subsequent years. The first SOP vote is also required to be held in
2011, at the same time with the vote on its frequency.(See C.1 for a rough time
line.) These SOP meetings would be held as a session in the annual meetings, during
which the shareholders vote to decide whether to approve the executive compensation
packages proposed by the management.10 The companies are given three choices of
the frequency: once per year, once every two years and once every three years.11 The
SEC also required that this voting take place in the first annual meeting after the
rule change. The companies with market capitalizations smaller than 75 million USD
were the only ones that were granted a later deadline, which was set in their annual
meetings in 2013. Each company is also required to disclose the voting result and
whether it will be implemented in its 8 − K filings. I obtained the SOP frequency
voting results from the ISS, which includes the year of the voting, the share of votes
for each of the three choices and whether the voting result was implemented. I also
obtained from ISS the information regarding the SOP meetings themselves, including
the meeting date and the vote share for and against the compensation plan proposed
by the management.
In addition, I obtained information pertaining to the company fundamentals from
Compustat as well as stock prices and market index prices from CRSP.
4.3 The identification strategy
It is challenging to establish the causal relationship between the frequency of
corporate governance and corporate innovation. There might be underlying factors,
10It’s important to clarify that there are two types of voting involved here, the voting to occur in
the SOP meetings and the voting beforehand on the frequency of these meetings. The second type
of voting provides me with the RDD identification, and the first type is involved in producing only
one set of results. The first type is used in Cunat el al 2015 but not the second type. I will refer to
the first type of voting as “SOP voting” and the second type as “SOP frequency voting”.
11I address later how RDD can be applied to voting with three possible outcomes.
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such as the innovation strategy of the company, that drive both variables. In addi-
tion, the shareholders may anticipate the innovation intensity of the firm and choose
governance frequency accordingly. As mentioned in the introduction, these underly-
ing factors, most of which relate to the propensity to innovate, are not observable,
and thus, are difficult to control for.
To overcome this challenge and prove causality, this paper exploits the 2011 SEC
mandated SOP frequency voting as an exogenous source of variation in the gover-
nance frequency. I apply regression discontinuity design(RDD) methodology, effec-
tively comparing the innovation outcomes of the firms whose shareholders voted for
“once per year” with a small margin over 50% to those that are marginally in favor
of “once every three years.” As long as these two groups of firms are identical in all
other aspects, we can attribute all later differences in innovation to the different SOP
frequencies adopted by the firms. This identifying assumption is subject to rigorous
falsification tests and found no evidence of it being violated, as is demonstrated later
in the paper. In particular, necessary for this methodology is the assumption that
the firms on the left and right side tight neighborhood around the cutoff are identical
in important firm characteristics and ex ante innovation variables. This assumption
is tested by applying the RDD to the firm characteristics and the ex ante innovation
variables. For this and other reasons listed below, the regulatory mandate exploited
provides a unique opportunity for clean identification.
4.3.1 No manipulation
The SOP frequency vote is rarely manipulated by management. If the man-
agement was able to influence votes cast by the shareholders, the “everything else
equal” assumption would be violated. This is because the firms that narrowly voted
for “once every three years” would have been more likely to possess characteristics
that make this voting outcome appealing to the management so that management
would try hard to sway the votes to obtain this result.12 Empirical testing shows that
12Imbens and Lemieux (2008) shows that the RDD is valid for identification as long as the
management cannot manipulate the outcome perfectly. But in that case the interpretation of the
causal effect would be less straightforward and its estimate less accurate. The SOP voting, which
has no manipulation at all, provides cleaner identification.
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this concern is not valid. Had manipulation occurred, there would be a discontinuity
at the 50% cutoff in the vote share distribution. Figure C.5 and Figure C.6 suggest
that this is not the case. 13
To evaluate the probability of manipulation rigorously, I applied the test of dis-
continuity in distribution developed by McCrary (2008). The point estimate of the
discontinuity is 0.1109 with a standard error of 0.1556, thereby making it insignificant.
Figure C.6 plots the probability density estimated by this test and the discontinuity
is shown to be almost nonexistent.
The absence of manipulation observed here is very rare in management initiated
shareholder voting. In the US, most voting is manipulated by the management, as
reported in Yermack (2010). The absence of manipulation in the SOP frequency
voting is probably due to the pressure for prudent governance in the immediate
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.
Theoretically, the absence of manipulation alone guarantees the satisfaction of the
“everything else the same” assumption in a large sample asymptotically Imbens and
Lemieux (2008). I nonetheless conducted falsification tests, known as the “balance
checks”(proposed by Roberts and Whited (2013)) to try to find potential violations
of this assumption. I did not find any. These in combination are strong evidence
that there exists little if any selection bias. The results of the balance checks are
presented in the results section.
4.3.2 Near 100% implementation
The “cause” in the causal relationship of interest is the implemented frequency of
the SOP rather than the mere voting frequency. If the voting result was not always
implemented, I would have needed to adjust the directly estimated effect size by the
implementation rate, introducing noise. But strikingly, the implementation of the
SOP frequency voting results are almost 100%, allowing for an intuitive and precise
sharp RDD. This feature of near perfect implementation is illustrated by figure C.7.
13The vote share in this figure appears asymmetric, representing the fact that in most firms, the
shareholders voted for “once per year”. This, however. does not affect the validity of the RDD in
any way. This asymmetry is probably a result of the elevated consciousness of governance after the
financial crisis.
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A near perfect implementation is unique to this particular voting occurrence,
as previous work has found that the management only implements a fraction of
these non-binding voting results(Yermack (2010)). This is again probably due to the
stringent application of corporate governance in the wake of the 2008 crisis.
4.3.3 Exogeneity of the participation and voting time
As explained earlier, all the firms that report to the SEC are required to hold
this voting procedure, and none of them have the luxury of doing so on their own
timeline. All the “big” firms were required to vote in their annual meeting in 2011,
while all “small” firms had to vote in their 2013 meetings, with the criteria for
each category (“big or small”)set arbitrarily by the SEC. Had the participation been
voluntary, the causal effect measured would have been the “local average” for the
firms motivated enough to hold such a voting, decreasing the external validity of
the identification. If the companies had had the freedom to choose the time of the
voting, the problem would have been even more complicated because it is well known
that on the aggregate level, innovations come in waves over time (Lerner and Seru
(2015)). Thus, it is possible that the companies might time the SOP frequency voting
to accommodate these innovation waves. Trying to overcome this problem by adding
time fixed effects would have biased the effect size estimation as the byproduct by
abandoning meaningful time series variations as pointed out by Hall et al. (2005).
Fortunately, this paper does not suffer from these concerns. Due to the mandated
participation and timing of this voting, all relevant variations can be controlled for.
This exogenous participation and timing is rare for shareholder voting, because most
shareholder voting is called not randomly, usually if and when needed.
4.3.4 SOP frequency representing governance frequency in general
“Say on pay” meetings are about more than just “pay”. They have been found
by previous papers to exert profound influence on corporate governance in general.
These SOP sessions are part of the shareholders’ annual meetings, during which other
important issues are communicated and discussed. Typically, the SOP session is the
last item on the agenda. The timing of the vote makes the SOP session a powerful tool
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of the shareholders when negotiating issues beyond executive compensation. After
listening to reports from management about past performance and future plans,
the shareholders can use the SOP vote to punish or reward the management for
all issues discussed in the annual meeting. Furthermore, what is at stake for the
management is arguably what they care the most: their compensation. It must be
noted that the result of the vote is not binding14, so the management can adopt pay
scheme that deviates from the shareholders’ vote. But Cun˜at et al. (2012) shows that
they nonetheless “get the message” and would modify behaviors shareholders signal
disapproval of. Ultimately, the frequency of the SOP vote substantially represents
the frequency of the governance actions that the shareholders get to take on the
management.
4.3.5 RDD applicable to voting with three possible outcomes
RDD is usually applied to votes with only two choices on the ballot. In the case
of SOP frequency vote the shareholders have three choices: once per year, once every
two years and once every three years. In the paper, I argue that the identification
assumptions carry over to the majority vote cases with three possible outcomes, as
long as the one of the voting result is not used in the analysis, and the vote shares
used are the ones for the remaining two choices. Loss of observations presents the
only downside to this method, but in this case less than 5% of the companies voted in
favor of “once every two years” so abandoning this outcome is not a significant loss.
The other two options typically receive most of the votes in my sample, an outcome
common to the plural majority votes.
4.3.6 External validity
RDD is known to have very strong internal validity but relatively weak external
validity. However, I argue that this does not apply to the RDD with vote share as
the running variable.
RDD would have had limited external validity had the running variable be a
fundamental characteristic of the firm. For example, if the treatment is applied only
14The SOP frequency voting are effectively binding, as explained above, but not necessarily the
SOP voting.
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to firms larger than a size threshold, then the RDD estimate is only locally valid for
the companies with sizes very close to the threshold. Vote share, however, is not a
fundamental feature of the company, so the firms close by the vote share threshold
may be anywhere in the spectrum of firm characteristics. These factors lessen our
concern over the external validity issue of this identification strategy.
4.4 Results
In this section, I first introduce the specification of the regression discontinuity
design (RDD) methodology that is used in generating all following results. Then I
conduct the balance checks which aim to further validate the internal validity of the
identification. Furthermore, I report the first set of results concerning innovation
outcome in terms of patent quantity and quality. Finally as an attempt to elucidate
the underlying mechanism, I report the results on the exploration - exploitation
dynamics.
4.4.1 Regression discontinuity design: specification
Throughout the analyses, I use regression discontinuity design (RDD) to estimate
the following varying weight regression, based on the methodology developed by
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012):
Yj = α+ βI3yrj + Pl(v, c) + Pr(v, c) + γI2011j + j (3.9)
Aside from the variables already defined in the previous subsection, Pl(v, c) is
a flexible polynomial function for observations on the left-hand side of the thresh-
old c; Pr(v, c) is a flexible polynomial function for observations on the right-hand
side of the threshold c with different polynomial orders; v is the total vote share
(percentage of votes in favor). This equation is estimated with more weight put on
the observations closer to the cutoff. This ensures that the analysis relies mostly on
the observations near the continuity, which leads to a ceteris paribus comparison.
Following the convention of the literature, I report throughout the results section
the polynomial specification of the fourth order, but the results are not substantially
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different when other orders are applied.
Indicator variable I2011j controls the difference in timing of when the SOP vote
takes place. Self selection of the participation time can result in endogeneity that is
difficult to control because the innovation comes in waves and the self selection may
cater to this time trend. This concern is not necessary in this setup, because the SEC
mandates that companies with market capitalization larger than 75 million dollars
hold the SOP frequency vote in their annual meetings in 2011 while those smaller
than 75 million vote in 2013. This arbitrary assignment of treatment time makes the
control simple because the variable that needs control is well defined and observable.
Aside from this covariate representing heterogenous in the vote mechanism itself, the
RDD identification assumptions validated in section 4.3 ensure that the firms whose
shareholders vote in favor of “once every three years” by a small margin of votes is
otherwise identical (on average) to firms whose shareholders vote in favor of “once
per year” by a small margin. The only difference between these two groups of firms
is that the undistracted firms would have the SOP once every three years while the
second group would have it every year. Thus, all differences in innovative outcomes
in subsequent years can be attributed to their different governance frequency.
4.4.2 Balance check
Theoretically, the absence of manipulation (shown in Section 4.3) alone guaran-
tees the satisfaction of the “everything else the same” assumption in a large sample
asymptotically Imbens and Lemieux (2008). I nonetheless conducted falsification
tests, known as the “balance checks”(Roberts and Whited (2013)) to try to find po-
tential violations of this assumption. I did not find any. The balance checks are
conducted via the comparison important ex ante(at year 2011) firm characteristics15
between the treatment and control groups to provide additional validation, as re-
ported in Table C.3 and Figure C.816. Should there be any selection bias, that is,
should the firms in the control and treatment groups differ in aspects that make
their innovation propensity different, the comparison would have yielded significant
15These firm characteristics are computed in the same way as Chemmanur and Tian (2018).
16Note that the balance checks are conducted via the RDD, just like the main results, as the
RDD are methodologies to compare two groups at their border.
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differences of the variables tested. Yet the discontinuity at cutoff is not significant for
all firm characteristics. This set of results show that firm characteristics that have
been shown to affect innovation do not differ significantly across the two groups.
Similar balance checks can be done on the outcome variables of this paper: I further
and show that the various innovation measures of interest do not differ significantly
across the treatment and the control before17 the treatment took place. (Table C.4
and Figure C.9) Taken together, this is strong evidence that the treatment and the
control groups differ only in whether the treatment is received.
4.4.3 Innovation quantity and quality
I find that compared with the control group, firms that hold say on pay (SOP)
votes once every three years generate similar amount of patents in the first year but
patents with greater quantity and quality in the third year.
The quantity of the innovation output measured by the patent count18 is the
most salient output of the innovation activity. Table C.5 reports the aforementioned
comparison in patent quantity. I find that undistracted firms produce similar number
of patents compared with the distracted companies in the first year after the SOP
frequency vote. The first installment of the SOP is required by SEC to be held
immediately after the SOP frequency vote, therefore this year is also the first year in
the three-year “undistracted period” for the firms that have SOPs once every three
years. In the third year, however, the difference emerges. The right column of Table
C.5 shows that in the third year, the undistracted firms produce 1.333 more patents
than the control group. Furthermore, this difference is robust with alternative orders
of polynomials in equation 3.9. This difference can also be seen in the rightmost
panel of Figure C.10. The sharp discontinuity at the vote cut-off represents the
effect size of the low frequency of the SOP. The fact that the fitted line breaks out
of the confidence interval of the boundary bin average of the opposite side is the
demonstration that the continuity is significant.
172010 values are taken for these variables.
18As discussed in the data section, in my sample there are not only granted patents but also
pre-grant patent applications. In this section I use the word “patent” to represent the combination
of both.
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The quality of a patent is measured based on the citations19 from other patents
that it would receive in the future. It has been shown by previous studies (such as
Hall et al. (2005) and Lerner and Seru (2015)) that citations of a patent not indicate
its scientific impact, but also correlate strongly with its private economic value to the
firm. It has also been found that the majority of patents submitted for any year are
worthless, while the remaining few have high values (Nordhaus (1989)). As a result,
citation counts have been used in a complimentary fashion to patent counts in the
study of innovation.
Table C.6 and Figure C.11 report the comparison in patent citation count. Undis-
tracted companies produce patents with similar quality compared with the distracted
companies in the first year after the SOP frequency vote. In the third year, however,
the difference emerges.
This drastic time varying effect also demonstrates the importance of a clean iden-
tification of the treatment time in innovation research. Since the firms can change
their output of innovation in matters of two years, any measurement error in the
treatment time that is larger than a year effectively produces a moving average of
the time varying effects with opposite signs. This may explain why the existent
studies find contradictory results when quantifying this relationship.
4.4.4 Exploration - exploitation dynamics
How are the undistracted firms able to produce more patents if given more time?
Why are they unable to do so in the first year of the cycle? Theories provided by
Manso (2011) and Kerr et al. (2014) predict that the results in subsection 4.4.3 can
be explained by the roles of exploration and exploitation, two integral stages nec-
essary to generate innovations with great value. “Exploration” surveys all possible
solutions to a problem or all possible areas to do R&D in. The information col-
lected in the exploration stage guides the innovator’s direction in the “exploration”
stage. They argue that the exploration stage is especially necessary for fundamental
innovations that venture into unchartered territories. But exploration is expensive
19As discussed in the data section, I designed a scheme to discount citations from a pre-grant
application. In this section by the word “citation” I refer to the citation number corrected by this
scheme.
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and its progress is hard to measure in the short term. These features may lead to
friction in corporate governance, especially when the frequency of the governance is
too high to appreciate the long term benefit of exploration. Therefore a possible
explanation of the previous results suggests that the undistracted firms do not have
short term performance pressure and are thus able to participate in exploration as
the first stage. The short term drop in patent value may reflect the time lag of the
benefit of exploration. To validate this mechanism, I search for evidence of more
explorative activities from the undistracted firms in the first year of the undistracted
period.
The results suggest that the undistracted firms are more explorative in the first
year of the undistracted period compared with the distracted firms. They file for
patents that cite significantly less of the work of the same field (Figure C.12 and
Table C.7).
Using the second measure of exploration, we confirm the above finding (Figure
C.13 and Table C.8). Firms with lower monitoring frequency cites a more diverse
spectrum of prior patents in the first year of the 3-year cycle, indicating a more in-
terdisciplinary type of exploration. Interestingly, in the second and third year, these
low-frequency firms start to do less exploration and more exploitation, evidenced by
the higher exploitation index. This suggests that these firms enter into the exploita-
tion stage when they cash in on the information collected in the previous stage. The
breadth of technology that the undistracted firms explore then drops to the same
level as the control firm suggesting that the undistracted firms regained focus.
The citation diversity Herfindahl index is taken the time series first difference to
further control for the firm specific inherent difference in terms of exploratitiveness
that is not resulted from the treatment. The findings confirm the preceding findings.
4.5 Robustness tests
In this subsection, I subject the above results to a battery of robustness tests, vary-
ing the specifications of RDD. These alternative specifications yield similar results
as reported above. For example, instead of using the optimally solved bandwidth for
the RDD, I applied fixed bandwidth and obtained qualitatively similar results (Table
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C.9). There has been debates which type of bandwidth setup is more internally valid
and I did the above test to show that our results are not flukes given rise by the
type I errors of the dynamic generation of bandwidth. In addition, as a falsification
test, I used alternative cutoffs 30% of the vote share as a dummy parameter to the
RDD and did not find any systematically significant result. 50% vote share is what is
necessary to pass a vote, whereas 30% does not have such consequence. Thus should
we observe that the RDD results are significant even if we apply 30%, then we know
that the identification itself is problematic and the previous results must have been
spurious. But this is not the case based on the results. (Table C.10) Furthermore,
all our results are robust with alternative orders of polynomials in equation 3.9.
4.6 Limitations
Aside from the limited external validity discussed in 4.3, a problem common to
all RDDs, the main limitation of this paper is that the setup does not allow us to
investigate the long term effect (longer than 3 years) of the frequency shock. The
reason is that this SEC policy is applicable on a continual basis. In 2014, 3 years
after the determination of the frequency, the clock has been reset and restarted for
another 3-year cycle. For researchers who want to look into the 4th year and 5th
year impact of the 2011 event may be tempted to analyze the innovation outcome of
the years 2014 and 2015, respectively. But the problem is that these years are not
only subject to the influence of the 3-year cycle that have finished, but also that of
the second 3-year cycle that started in 2014 and is ongoing. To put it another way,
the year 2014 is not only the 4th year after the start of the first 3-year cycle, but also
the 1st year of the second 3-year cycle. So any effect found in those years will be a
combination of two sources of causal relationships that cannot be teased apart from
each other.
Another aspect that future work can make improvement in is adding two more
firm characteristics to the balance checks: institutional ownership and shareholder
information asymmetry proxied by analyst forecast dispersion. Both factors have
been shown to affect innovation (Aghion et al. (2013) and Hall and Lerner (2010))
so should be included in the balance checks. The author is currently unable to do
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so due to data access constraints. However, it’s important to note that even if these
two firm characteristics differ between the treatment and the control, one can solve
the problem by including those two controls in the estimation of the RDD.
4.7 Conclusion
This paper provides strong evidence that commitment to governance with long
term performance evaluation period encourages exploration which leads to innovation
with less economic value in the short term, but innovation with more economic
value and scientific value in the long term. In addition, exploration demonstrates
permanent effect of shifting the technological focus of a firm to the more promising
fields in the future.
These findings suggests the importance of matching governance frequencies with
the natural periodicity of the innovation activities that the firms meant to undertake.
In sub-section 4.4.4 we observe shifting from exploration to exploitation in the second
and third year of the three year evaluation period. Though the outcome is superior
than SOPs once a year, this shift is not necessarily optimal. It is possible that the
shift to exploitation is still too early. This results advocates the SEC’s allowance of
options of even lower frequency of the SOP. A concern might be that an option of
lower frequency may open the Pandora’s box for the management to manipulate the
shareholders into choosing a frequency that is too low for their best interest. But the
absence of manipulation in the 2011 and 2013 votes is reassuring.
The SOP frequency votes suggests a decentralized way of assigning appropriate
time length for governance horizon. A one size fit all governance frequency is obvi-
ously not optimal.(Kerr and Nanda (2014)) Mandating shareholders to vote on this
issue serves to utilize the information the shareholders have about the idiosyncracy
of the innovation that the firm is conducting. To the extent that the shareholders
can rationally determine ex ante the appropriate governance horizon, voting serves
as a commitment device. Therefore testing whether the SOP frequency votes choose
the optimal frequency for each firm can be a fruitful area of future research.
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Summary
The three chapters of this PhD thesis explore three ways in which financial mis-
coordination can happen. In the classical economic framework pioneered by works
of Adam Smith, each agent only needs to optimize her own welfare. But in the
end by virtue of the invisible hand, the resources are allocated in a way that is
socially optimal. In this thesis, I research on instances when the invisible hand fails
to motivate the players to act optimally for the common good of the society.
The thesis first explore in the context of trading speed competition. In the trading
platforms, there are not only mutually beneficial strategic complementarities between
a maker and a taker, but there are also zero-sum strategic substitutions between
any two makers or any two takers. Thus an arms-race like speed competition is a
likely outcome amongst the makers or amongst the takers. In a theoretical model, I
demonstrate that whether the cost outweighs the benefit depends crucially on how
the marginal contribution of trading speed to the gains from trade changes with
trading speed itself. I show that when it is decreasing, the market discipline by the
technological expenses borne by the traders themselves is not sufficient to curb the
speed competition – the traders would over-invest in speed and exhibit “arms-race
behavior”. In the end of this chapter, I provide a micro-foundation for this decreasing
gain from trade of trading speed, based on the classical Merton portfolio re-balancing
problem.
Then I did my investigation in the banking context. Given limited liability, equity
holders have incentives to engage in “risk shifting”: she would take on excessive risk so
that she’s the one that benefits when the realized outcome is good, but her creditors
are the ones to suffer the downside losses. In the context of commercial banks, the
market discipline in place to address this conflict of interest is by ways of short-
term, demandable debts. I show theoretically that higher risk taken by the bank
may discourage runs when the bank equity buffer is low. I demonstrate that this
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is a result of a common fact in finance: the higher the asset risk, the higher also
is the asset upside payoff. When the bank goes bankrupt, the depositors effectively
becomes the residual claimant of the asset at its maturity. Thus a higher asset risk
means the asset would pay more when it succeeds, which benefits the depositors if
they do not run and hold their deposits until maturity. This theory explains well
the risk management practice of counting high payoff assets as substitutes for capital
amongst commercial banks.
In the last part of the thesis, I move to a corporate governance context and set
out to empirically test a long held question: do frequent evaluation of the CEO hurt
or encourage firm innovation? I show that if given the opportunity to monitor the
CEO too frequently, shareholders discipline may make the CEO reluctant to under-
take R&D projects that are costly in the short term but valuable in the long term. I
establish the causal relationship between evaluation frequency and corporate innova-
tion by comparing the innovation outcomes of companies with different frequencies of
SOP. To address the endogeneity problem, I take advantage of a special rule imposed
by the SEC: the frequency of evaluation itself has to be determined for each company
by shareholder votes. This allows me to conduct “regression discontinuity design”
analysis to demonstrate that shareholder discipline may stifle innovation when the
market is not able to accurately valuate innovations. This result speaks to the inter-
net frenzy in late 1990s when tech companies are valuated much higher than their
true value.
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Samenvatting
De drie hoofstukken van deze PhD scriptie verkennen drie manieren waarin fi-
nancie¨le mis-coo¨rdinatie kan gebeuren. In de klassieke economische framework ge-
pionierd door het werk van Adam Smith, hoeft elke agent alleen maar haar eigen
welvaart te optimaliseren. Maar door wijze van de onzichtbare hand worden alle
hulpmiddelen gealloceerd op een manier dat optimaal is voor de maatschappij. In
deze scriptie onderzoek ik gevallen waar de onzichtbare hand faalt om de spelers te
motiveren om optimaal op te treden voor het algemeen belang van de maatschappij.
Deze scriptie verkent eerst de context van competitie voor verhandel snelheid.
Op verhandel platforms zijn er niet alleen wederzijdse strategische contemplariteiten
tussen een maker en een nemer, maar er zijn ook nul-som strategische substituties
tussen ieder twee makers en ieder twee nemers. Dus een wapenwedloop voor snelheid
is een aannemelijk uitkomst tussen de makers of tussen de nemers. In een theore-
tische model demonstreer ik dat de situatie wanneer kosten compenseren voor de
profijten cruciaal af hangt van hoe de marginale contributie van verhandelsnelheid
op de verhandelwinsten verandert met verhandelsnelheid zichzelf. Ik toon aan dat
als het afnemend is, dan is de market discipline door de technologische kosten ge-
dragen door de verhandelaars zichzelf niet voldoende om competitie voor snelheid
in te tomen – de verhandelaars zullen over-investeren in snelheid en “wapenwedloop
gedrag” vertonen.
Daarna deed ik mijn onderzoek in de context van banken. Vanwege beperkte
aansprakelijkheid hebben aandeelhouders een drijfveer om “risico-verschuiving” te
beoefenen: zij zullen excessief risico nemen om te profiteren wanneer de gerealiseerde
uitkomst goed is, maar de crediteuren zijn degene die de nadelige verliezen verdragen.
In de context van commercie¨le banken zijn er market disciplines in plaats om deze
conflict van interesses te adresseren door middel van korte-termijn opeisbare schulden.
Ik toon theoretisch aan dat het hoger risico nemen van de bank een bank run kan
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ontmoedigen wanneer het vermogens buffer van de bank laag is. Ik demonstreer dat
dit het resultaat is van een veelvoorkomend feit in financie¨n: hoe hoger de risico
van het activum, hoe hoger is ook de voordelige vergoeding. Wanneer de bank
failliet gaat, dan worden de depositohouders daadwerkelijk de overgebleven eiser van
de activum op het einde van de looptijd. Dus een hoger activum risico betekent
dat het activum meer uitkeert wanneer het succesvol is, wat dus gunstig is voor
de depositohouders als zij niet terugtrekken en hun deposito’s houden tot het einde
van de looptijd. Deze theorie verklaart goed de risico management praktijk om
hoog vergoedende activum te tellen als substitutie voor kapitaal onder commercie¨le
banken.
In het laatste gedeelte van de scriptie schuif ik naar een ondernemingsbestuur
context en test ik empirisch een lang gestelde vraag: lijdt of stimuleert bedrijfsin-
novatie onder frequente evaluatie van de CEO? Ik laat zien dat als er gelegenheden
gegeven zijn om de CEO te frequent te monitoren, dan zal aandeelhouder discipline
de CEO terughoudend maken om R&D projecten te ondernemen die kostelijk zijn
op de korte-termijn maar waardevol op de lange-termijn. Ik breng een causale ver-
band tot stand tussen evaluatie frequentie en ondernemingsinnovatie door innovatie
uitkomsten van bedrijven met verschillende SOP frequenties te vergelijken. Om de
endogeniteit te adresseren maak ik gebruik van een speciale regeling opgelegd door
de SEC: de frequentie van evaluatie zichzelf moet vastgesteld worden voor iedere
bedrijf door de stemmen van de aandeelhouder. Dit laat mij toe om een “regression
discontinuity design” analyse uit te voeren om te demonstreren dat aandeelhouders
discipline innovatie kan onderdrukken wanneer de markt niet capabel is om nauw-
keurig de innovaties te waarderen. Deze resultaat spreekt de internet waanzin aan op
het einde van de jaren 90 toen de technologische bedrijven veel hoger gewaardeerd
waren dan hun echte waardering.
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Appendix A
Trading speed competition: Can the arms race go
too far?
A.1 Gains from Trade: Micro-Foundations
A.1.1 An Extended Setup
In our extended framework, portfolio rebalancing is the main motivation for trad-
ing. We build our analysis on the Merton (1969) style portfolio selection problem in
which risk-averse takers trade due to a re-balancing need resulting from market price
changes. One could alternatively look at a dynamic hedging problem for a non-linear
derivative position where the taker is risk averse to hedging error and can only trade
at random points in time; the intuition in such a problem would run along the same
lines. In turn, the makers in our extended model are risk neutral, are rewarded a
share of the gains from trade from the takers and serve to provide liquidity. Overall,
this new setup extends from the one in Subsection 2.3.1, integrating the mechanism
generating the need for trading.
We now assume that in an economy of infinite time horizon, there are two assets
available for trade. There is a risk free asset with constantly compounded rate of r:
dX0(t) = rX0(t)dt, (A.1.1)
and a risky asset whose price change follows a geometric Brownian motion:
dX1(t) = αX1(t)dt+ σX1(t)dB(t), (A.1.2)
where B(t) is a Brownian motion. Only the risky asset is traded (in a LOB).
We allow continuous quantities of limit orders in the order book to be traded
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on, after which the rest of the limit order is withdrawn by assumption. This way,
the book fully accommodates the desire to continuously rebalance as a result of price
changes. By assumption, if the LOB is filled, there is always enough volume available
to accommodate any trading demand of a single trader.1 Whenever a maker arrives
to an empty LOB, she can fill it to “full”, meaning that she puts in a limit buy
order as well as a sell order, both of infinite size. The taker has an opportunity to
trade when she arrives to the LOB and sees that the LOB is full (i.e., it has been
filled by a maker and not yet been hit by another taker). Whenever she sees this
opportunity, the taker will trade almost surely in equilibrium, since the price of the
risky asset is continuously changing and therefore, her portfolio deviates from the
optimal portfolio with probability 1.
We maintain the assumptions in Section 3.2 about the monitoring intensities of
the makers and the takers. Thus for any taker j, the occurrences of the joint event
that “she reaches the book and the book is filled at the time” follow a Poisson Point
Process (PPP): (s1, s2, . . . ), henceforth referred to as this taker’s “trading times”.
Note that a certain taker’s trading time is discrete and stochastic.
Let P (t) denote the Poisson process from which the aforementioned PPP is gen-
erated. Thus the differential:
dP (t) =

1 when ∃n, such that: sn ∈ [t, t+ dt),
0 otherwise.
And the intensity parameter of this parameter, henceforth referred to as her
“trading frequency” can be computed:
λj =
τj µ¯
µ¯+ τ¯ . (A.1.3)
In this section, we take intensities as given, as they are chosen before trading
1Restricting the available volume in the LOB would only strengthen our results. To see this, with
infrequent trading, the required trading size will on average be larger than with frequent trading as
the volatility of realized distortions from optimal portfolio weights since the last trade is larger. As a
result, the constraint on available depth becomes less and less binding, implying declining marginal
GFT.
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starts. Hence, we can abstract from the multitude of agents of the previous sections
and focus on one of the takers, say j. For this representative taker, let W0(t) and
W1(t) be the amount of her wealth invested in the risk free and the risky securities
respectively at time t. Q(t) is the amount of wealth that she transfers from the risky
asset to the risk free asset at her trading time t = sn, n = 1, 2, . . . . Let C(t) be the
process of her consumption flow. The consumption of the taker is allowed to happen
continuously.
We assume that there is a cost for each transaction paid by the taker to the maker
involved. This fee equals a fixed proportion pim of the GFT g(P (t)) of this trade with
the trade size P (t). We further assume that whenever trade execution happens, the
rest of the depth (i.e., the remaining limit orders) is automatically canceled. This
simplifying assumption implies that the maker responsible for these orders does not
have to monitor again to cancel them.
To generate a need for portfolio rebalancing, we assume the takers to be risk
averse with log utility and CRRA with relative risk aversion parameter δ.2
A.1.2 Endogenizing Gains from Trade
In order to endogenize the gains from trade, we first define the problem of taker
j, the solution of which pins down all the quantities in this model.
We assume that each taker maximizes the expected sum of her time-discounted
consumption trajectory under inter-temporal budget constraints and the no-bankruptcy
constraint.
Definition 10 Given her trading frequency λj, the “taker’s problem” is each taker
j’s problem to choose the quantity of portfolio re-balancing {Q(t)}t=sn3 and the con-
tinuous consumption process {C(t)}t≥0 to solve:
max
{C(t),Q(t)}t
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtU(C(t))dt ≡ J(x, y, t = 0|λj , pim), (A.1.4)
2Our results can be generated for any utility function with risk aversion. The log utility function
happens to provide us with a high degree of tractability.
3Sometimes we write {Q(t)}t=sn simply as {Q(t)}t≥0, since the value of Q(t) doesn’t matter
when dP (t) = 0.
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subject to:
W0(0) = x, (A.1.5)
W1(0) = y, (A.1.6)
dW0(t) = W0(t)
dX0(t)
X0(t)
− C(t)dt+ (Q(t)− pimg(Q(t)))dP (t), (A.1.7)
dW1(t) = W1(t)
dX1(t)
X1(t)
−Q(t)dP (t), (A.1.8)
0 ≤W0(t) +W1(t), (A.1.9)
where
g(Q(t)|λj , pim) ≡ J(W0(t) +Q(t),W1(t)−Q(t), t|λj , pim)− J(W0(t),W1(t), t|λj , pim).
(A.1.10)
Equations (A.1.5) and (A.1.6) are initial conditions. Equations (A.1.7) and
(A.1.8) are the laws of motions for the risk free security and the risky security,
respectively. Finally, inequality (A.1.9) is the no-bankruptcy condition for taker j.
The term −Q(t)dP (t) in equation (A.1.8) and the term Q(t)dP (t) in equation
(A.1.7) represent that wealth of amount Q(t)4 is transferred from the risky security
to the risk free security at time t = sn, n = 1, 2, . . . .
In equation A.1.10, the gain from trade function g(Q(t)) is defined as the value
function (defined in (A.1.4)) when this trade is carried out at quantity Q(t), sub-
tracted by the value function when this trade is not carried out. Correspondingly,
term pimg(Q(t))dP (t) in equation (A.1.7) represents that this transaction Q(t) costs
the taker pimg(Q(t))), which is a proportion pim of the gain from this trade: g(Q(t))).
As we explain later, this assumption of the transaction cost being proportional to
the gain from a trade is crucial for the tractability of our model.
Next, we define the “expected marginal GFT”, the variable that we endogenize
in this section.
4Q(t) is allowed to be negative in which case the transfer is the other way around.
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Definition 11 The “expected marginal GFT”, is defined as:
G(λj , pim) ≡ Et=sng(Q∗(W0(sn),W1(sn)), sn|λj , pim), (A.1.11)
where Q∗(W0(sn),W1(sn)) is the second argument of the solution to the problem in
Definition 10.
By the properties of the conditional expectations, for a given taker j, every one
of her trade has the identical ex ante expected gain. It equals the expectation of
the gain from trade function g(Q(t)) (defined in equation (A.1.10)), evaluated at the
optimal trade size: Q∗(W0(sn),W1(sn), t).
The goal of this section is to identify, for any taker j, the monotonicity of her
expected GFT for a trade: G(λj , pim) with respect to her trading frequency λj .
A.1.3 Asymptotically Diminishing Expected GFT for a Trade
As shown by the review of Pham (2009), a closed-form solution is not currently
possible for the type of stochastic control problem as in Definition 10.5 But we are
able to bypass the need for an analytic solution of this problem, and instead identify
the monotonicity of the expected GFT for a trade directly.
To achieve this, we first simplify the problem by showing that its solution is to
equivalent to that of a similar problem without transaction costs.
Proposition 7 (sufficient condition of the monotonicity of the “expected
marginal GFT”) To show that G(λj , pim) defined in Definition 11 decreases in λj,
it suffices to show that the following quantity is concave in λj:
J(W0(0),W1(0), 0|λj , pim = 0).
Proof. See appendix. 
Simply put, this quantity is the value function of problem 10 when there is no
5Our problem 10 differs from the classic portfolio re-balancing models, such as Merton (1969),
in two important ways. First, the trade can only occur at discrete random time points; second,
there is transaction costs when the trade happens.In this aspect, our model is therefore related to
the models of dynamic equilibria with transaction costs, such as Constantinides (1986), but they do
not have the restriction that the trades can only happen at discrete random time points.
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transaction cost. Intuitively, this result crucially follows from the assumption that
for any trade, the transaction cost is proportional to the gain from this trade. In this
case, at any of the trading times sn, n = 1, 2, . . . , the actual objective function of the
taker is simply a linear transformation of the objective function of the corresponding
transaction-cost-free problem.
Based on the Proposition 7, it remains only to show that J(W0(0),W1(0), 0|λj , pim =
0) 6 is concave in λj . To achieve this, we first write down the Bellman Equation of
the problem without transaction cost.
Equation (A.1.4) can be restated in dynamic programming form to apply the
Bellman Principle of Optimality:
J [W0(t0),W1(t0), t0|λj ] =
max
C(s),W1(s)
Et0
[∫ t
t0
e−ρsU [C(s)]ds) + J [W0(t),W1(t), t|λj ]|W0(t0),W1(t0)
]
.
(A.1.12)
Then by Taylor’s theorem and the mean value theorem for integrals, there exist
t¯ ∈ [t0, t], such that the above equation can be restated as:
J [W0(t0),W1(t0), t0|λj ] =
max
C(t),W1(t)
E(t0)
[
e−ρt¯U [C(t¯)]l + J + ∂J
∂W0(t0)
(W0(t)−W0(t0))
+ ∂J
∂W1(t0)
(W1(t)−W1(t0)) + 12
∂2J
∂W1(t0)2
(W1(t)−W1(t0))2
+λj [J(W0(t0) +Q(t0),W1(t0)−Q(t0), t0|λj)− J(W0(t0),W1(t0))] + o(l)
]
.
(A.1.13)
where l ≡ t− t0 is the latency at time t0. The last term is due to the possibility
of the jump of the portfolio processes.
We now take the Et0 operator onto each term, and eliminate J [W0(t0),W1(t0), t0|λj ] =
Et0J [W0(t0),W1(t0), t0|λj ] from both sides, then evaluate Et0 [W0(t)−W0(t0), t0|λj ],
6Henceforth written as: J(W0(0),W1(0), 0|λj)
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Et0 [W1(t)−W1(t0)] and Et0 [W1(t)−W1(t0)]2, and finally take the limit as l→ 0 we
get:
0 = max
C(t),W1(t)
[
U [C(t)]− ρJ [W0(t),W1(t), t0|λj ] + ∂J
∂W0(t)
(rW0(t)− C(t))
+ ∂J
∂W1(t)
αW1(t) +
1
2σ
2W 21 (t)
∂2J
∂W 21 (t)
+λj [J(W0(t) +Q(t),W1(t)−Q(t), t0|λj)− I(W0(t),W1(t))]
]
(A.1.14)
Using the technique of asymptotic expansion of the solution as in Roger and Zane
(2002), we are able to show the asymptotic concavity of the expected gain from a
trade in the trading speed, as l→ 0 .
Proposition 8 (expected aggregate GFT without transaction cost) For each
taker, her value function J [W0(0),W1(0), 0|λj ] is a concave function of λj to the 2nd
order of the inverse of the trading frequency λj, 7, that is, as the trading frequency
λj is high enough that 1λ2
j
is negligible.
Proof. See appendix. 
Our reasoning in the proof is based on asymptotic expansion. The very high
speed of the HFTs warrants our assumptions of λj getting very large in the current
trading environment.
The concavity comes from the nature of the Geometric Brownian price change in
combination with risk aversion. With a Geometric Brownian Motion, the variance
of returns is proportional to time elapsed. The expected MGFT is proportional to
the expected variance reduction due to trading, and hence by transitivity to time
elapsed. Since the average time span between trades declines with transaction inten-
sity, expected MGFT are decreasing in transaction intensity.
A.2 Figures
7While fixing the main arguments W0,W1.
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A.3 Proofs
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 1] We derive some mathematical results:
∂
(
τj µ¯
µ¯+τ¯
)
∂µi
= τj τ¯(µ¯+ τ¯)2 , (A.3.15)
∂
(
τj µ¯
µ¯+τ¯
)
∂τj
= µ¯
2 + µ¯(τ¯ − τj)
(µ¯+ τ¯)2 , (A.3.16)
∂
(
τj µ¯
µ¯+τ¯
)
∂τk
= − τj µ¯(µ¯+ τ¯)2 , ∀k 6= j. (A.3.17)
For the SPP of Definition 1, we derive first order conditions with respect to
µi, i = 1, 2, . . . ,M and τj , j = 1, 2, . . . , N . The FOC w.r.t. µi is given by:
βµi =
N∑
j=1
G
(
τj µ¯
µ¯+ τ¯
)
τj τ¯
(µ¯+ τ¯)2 +
N∑
j=1
G′
(
τj µ¯
µ¯+ τ¯
)
τ2j µ¯τ¯
(µ¯+ τ¯)3 , (A.3.18)
And the FOC w.r.t. τj is given by :
γτj = G
(
τj µ¯
µ¯+ τ¯
)
µ¯2 + µ¯(τ¯ − τj)
(µ¯+ τ¯)2 +G
′
(
τj µ¯
µ¯+ τ¯
)
µ¯2 + µ¯(τ¯ − τj)
(µ¯+ τ¯)2
τj µ¯
µ¯+ τ¯
− τj µ¯(µ¯+ τ¯)2
∑
k 6=j
G
(
τkµ¯
µ¯+ τ¯
)
− τj µ¯(µ¯+ τ¯)2
∑
k 6=j
G′
(
τkµ¯
µ¯+ τ¯
)
τkµ¯
µ¯+ τ¯ . (A.3.19)
Due to the symmetry of the problem, the optimal monitoring intensity for all
makers should be equal, so are those of the takers. Thus we plug into (A.3.18) and
(A.3.19) the symmetry conditions:
µi = µˆ =
µ¯
M
, for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,M ;
τj = τˆ =
τ¯
N
, for all j = 1, 2, . . . , N. (A.3.20)
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The FOCs now simplify to
βµˆ = G
(
Mµˆτˆ
Mµˆ+Nτˆ
)
N2τˆ2
(Mµˆ+Nτˆ)2 +G
′
(
Mµˆτˆ
Mµˆ+ τˆ
)
MµˆN2τˆ3
(Mµˆ+Nτˆ)3 , (A.3.21)
γτˆ = G
(
τˆMµˆ
Mµˆ+Nτˆ
)
M2µˆ2
(Mµˆ+Nτˆ)2 +G
′
(
Mµˆτˆ
Mµˆ+Nτˆ
)
M3µˆ3τˆ
(Mµˆ+Nτˆ)3 .
(A.3.22)
Similar to Foucault et al. (2013), we divide (A.3.21) by (A.3.22) and rewrite to get:
µˆ
τˆ
=
(
γ
β
N2
M2
) 1
3
. (A.3.23)
We now set G(·) = G0. This implies that G′(·) = 0. Moreover, we slightly rewrite
(A.3.23) to
µˆ =
(
γ
β
N2
M2
) 1
3
τˆ . (A.3.24)
Substituting (A.3.24) into (A.3.21) and (A.3.22) and slightly rewriting, we get:
µˆ = N
2
(Mrˆ +N)2
G0
β
, (A.3.25)
τˆ = M
2r2
(Mrˆ +N)2
G0
γ
, (A.3.26)
where
rˆ =
(
γ
β
N2
M2
) 1
3
. (A.3.27)
Total welfare is obtained by substituting first best intensities into the welfare
function:
Πˆ = Mµˆ ·Nτˆ
Mµˆ+Nτˆ G0 −
βMµˆ2
2 −
γNτˆ2
2 . (A.3.28)

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Proof. [Proof of Proposition 2] From Definition 2, we obtain FOCs for (individual)
makers and takers. The FOC for maker I is given by
βµi = pim
µ¯+ τ¯ − µi
(µ¯+ τ¯)2
N∑
j=1
G
(
τjµ¯
µ¯+ τ¯
)
τj + pim
µiτ¯
(µ¯+ τ¯)3
N∑
j=1
G′
(
τj µ¯
µ¯+ τ¯
)
τ2j ,
(A.3.29)
and for taker j by
γτj = pit
µ¯2 + µ¯(τ¯ − τj)
(µ¯+ τ¯)2
[
G
(
τj µ¯
µ¯+ τ¯
)
+G′
(
τjµ¯
µ¯+ τ¯
)
τj µ¯
µ¯+ τ¯
]
. (A.3.30)
To solve for a symmetric equilibrium, we plug (A.3.20) into (A.3.29) and (A.3.30)
and get:
βµˆ = pim
N2τˆ2 +N(M − 1)µˆτˆ
(Mµˆ+Nτˆ)2 G
(
τˆMµˆ
Mµˆ+Nτˆ
)
+ pim
µˆN2τˆ3
(Mµˆ+Nτˆ)3G
′
(
τˆMµˆ
Mµˆ+Nτˆ
)
,
(A.3.31)
γτˆ = pit
M2µˆ2 +M(N − 1)µˆτˆ
(Mµˆ+Nτˆ)2
[
G
(
τˆMµˆ
Mµˆ+Nτˆ
)
+ τˆMµˆ
Mµˆ+Nτˆ G
′
(
τˆMµˆ
Mµˆ+Nτˆ
)]
.
(A.3.32)
We now set G(·) = G0. This implies that G′(·) = 0. Substituting into (A.3.31)
and (A.3.32), we get:
µ∗ = N(τ
∗)2 +N(M − 1)µ∗τ∗
(Mµ∗ +Nτ∗)2
pimG0
β
, (A.3.33)
τ∗ = M
2(µ∗)2 +M(N − 1)µ∗τ∗
(Mµ∗ +Nτ∗)2
pitG0
γ
. (A.3.34)
Dividing (A.3.33) by (A.3.34), we get
µ∗
τ∗
= N(τ
∗)2 +N(M − 1)µ∗τ∗
M2(µ∗)2 +M(N − 1)µ∗τ∗
pimγ
pitβ
. (A.3.35)
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Rewriting yields
0 = M2(µ∗)3 +M(N − 1)(µ∗)2τ∗ − z(N(τ∗)3 +N(M − 1)µ∗(τ∗)2), (A.3.36)
where z = γβ
pim
pit
. Now we multiplying through with MNNτ∗ . We now have that (A.3.36)
is equivalent to
Nr3 + (N − 1)r2 − (M − 1)zr −Mz = 0, (A.3.37)
where r = Mµ
∗
Nτ∗ . Let r∗ be the positive real root to (A.3.37). We must have that
Mµ∗ = r∗Nτ∗. Substituting this into (A.3.33) and (A.3.34), we get
µ∗ = M + (M − 1)r
∗
M(1 + r∗)2
pim
β
, (A.3.38)
τ∗ = N(r
∗)2 + (N − 1)r∗
N(1 + r∗)2
pit
γ
. (A.3.39)
These solutions are similar to Foucault et al 2013 A6-A11.
EQ ”total welfare”, defined as the sum of all agents’ profit is given by:
Π∗ = Mµ
∗ ·Nτ∗
Mµ∗ +Nτ∗G0 −
βM(µ∗)2
2 −
γN(τ∗)2
2 . (A.3.40)

Proof. [Proof of Lemma 3] The proof directly follows from substituting G(·) = G0
into equations (A.3.21), (A.3.22), (A.3.31), and (A.3.32). 
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 4] The proof directly follows from equations (A.3.21),
(A.3.22), (A.3.31), and (A.3.32). 
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Proof. [Proof of Proposition 3] Since µi, τj ≥ 0∀i, j, we have that the terms in (2.11)
to (2.14) involving G′ have the same sign as G′. Keeping everything else constant,
the other terms are as in the case with G′ = 0. The term involving G′ in (2.12) is in
absolute terms smaller or equal than in (2.11) because µiµ¯ ≤ 1, leading to an under-
reaction compared to first best. The term involving G′ in (2.14) is in absolute terms
larger or equal than in (2.13) because µ¯
2(µ¯+τ−j)
µ¯3 ≥ 1, leading to an over-reaction
compared to first best. This term is multiplied with pim for makers and with 1− pim
for takers, which proves the interaction effect. 
Proof. [Proof of proposition 7] We first express J(W0(0),W1(0), 0|λj , pim) recursively.
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By definition,
J(W0(0),W1(0), 0|λj , pim)
= max
{C(s)}0≤s≤s1
Et=0
∫ s1
0
e−ρsU(C(s))ds
+ Et=0e−ρs1
[
(1− pim)g(Q∗(s1)) + J(W0(s1),W1(s1), s1|λj , pim)
]
= max
{C(s)}0≤s≤s1
Et=0
∫ s1
0
e−ρsU(C(s))ds
+ Et=0e−ρs1(1− pim)g(Q∗(s1))
+ Et=0 max{C(s)}s1≤s≤s2
Et=s1
∫ s2
s1
e−ρs1e−ρsU(C(s))ds
+ Et=0Et=s1e−ρs2J(W0(s2),W1(s2), s2|λj , pim)
+ Et=0Et=s1e−ρs2(1− pim)g(Q∗(s2))
(Iterate the above process by N − 1 times...;)
n→+∞−−−−−→∑
n=1,2,...
max
{C(s)}sn−1≤s≤sn
Et=0
∫ sn
sn−1
e−ρsn−1e−ρsU(C(s))ds
+ 0 · Et=0J(W0(sN ),W1(sN ), sN |λj , pim)
+ Et=0
∑
n=1,2,...
e−ρsn(1− pim)g(Q∗(sn))
=J(W0(0),W1(0), 0|0, pim)
+ (1− pim)G(λj , pim)Et=0
∑
n=1,2,...
e−ρsn
(by definition: G(λj , pim) ≡ Et=0g(Q∗(sn)))
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Evaluate the second term, we have:
(1− pim)G(λj , pim)Et=0
∑
n=1,2,...
e−ρsn
=(1− pim)G(λj , pim)
∑
n=1,2,...
Et=0e−ρsn
=(1− pim)G(λj , pim)
∑
n=1,2,...
∫ ∞
0
e−ρsn
λj
Γ(n)s
n−1
n e
−λjsndsn
(We plug in the pdf of Gamma(n, λ) distribution)
=(1− pim)G(λj , pim)
∑
n=1,2,...
(
λj
ρ+ λj
)n
=1− pim
ρ
G(λj , pim)λj
Thus:
J(W0(0),W1(0), 0|λj , pim) = J(W0(0),W1(0), 0|0, pim) + 1− pim
ρ
G(λj , pim)λj
(A.3.41)
We now prove that if J(W0(0),W1(0), 0|λj , pim) is concave in λj for any pim > 0,
then G(λj , pim) decreases in λj , for any pim > 0. The proof is by contradiction.
Suppose that G(λj , pim) does not monotonically decrease in λj , then by the con-
tinuity of G(λj , pim) in λj , there must exist an interval of λj inside [0,+∞) on
which G(λj , pim)λj is (locally) convex in λj , a contradiction to the concavity of
J(W0(0),W1(0), 0|λj , pim).
Finally, we prove that if J(W0(0),W1(0), 0|λj , pim = 0) is concave in λj , then so
is J(W0(0),W1(0), 0|λj , pim). Since A.3.41 applies for any 1 ≥ pim ≥ 0, Then:
J(W0(0),W1(0), 0|λj , 0) = J(W0(0),W1(0), 0|0, pim) + 1
ρ
G(λj , pim)λj (A.3.42)
Notice that J(W0(0),W1(0), 0|0, pim) is flat with respect to λj , thus the concavity of
J(W0(0),W1(0), 0|λj , 0) implies the concavity of 1ρG(λj , pim)λj , which in turn implies
the concavity of J(W0(0),W1(0), 0|λj , pim). 
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Proof. [Proof of proposition 8] A closed-form solution is not currently possible even
for the problem without transaction cost Pham (2009), but the problem without
transaction cost allows for an asymptotic Taylor expansion of the solution, as in
Roger and Zane (2002). First, we define l ≡ λ−1j is the latency of the trades for
taker j, where the subscript is suppressed on the left hand side. We apply a Taylor
expansion around l = 0 and get that J [x, y, 0|λj , 0] can be expressed by that of the
Merton (1969) problem with continuous trading, adjusted by higher order terms.
J [x, y, 0|λj , 0] = a−δU(x+ y) +
∞∑
n=1
bn
ln
n! , (A.3.43)
where a−δU(x + y) is the value function of the Merton (1969) problem, and a−δ ≡
1
δ
(
ρ+ (δ − 1)
[
r + (α−r)
2
2δσ2
])
is a coefficient entirely composed of exogenous param-
eters. Naturally,
∑∞
n=1 bn
ln
n! < 0, such that J [x, y, 0|λj , 0] < a−δU(x + y) for l > 0.
Hence, the (asymptotic) shape of J [x, y, 0|λj , 0] depends on bn, n ≥ 1.
Following Roger and Zane (2002), we can solve for:
b1 = − σ
6δ3w2(1− w)2
2σ2δρ+ (δ − 1)[2δσ2r + (α− r)2] , (A.3.44)
where w ≡ α−rσ2δ is the equilibrium portfolio weight of the risky asset in the Merton
(1969) portfolio problem, which is entirely composed of exogenous parameters. As
long as the risk-aversion parameter δ is large enough (and for sure when δ > 1),
we have b1 < 0.Assuming that latency l is very small, a fact very much true in the
context of HFTs, terms b2, b3, . . . are negligible and we have
J [x, y, 0|λj , 0] ≈ a−δU(x+ y) + b1l = a−δU(x+ y) + b1λ−1j . (A.3.45)
Taking the second order derivative we see that the value function is asymptotically
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concave in trading speed if δ is sufficiently large:
∂2J [x, y, 0|λj , 0]
∂(λj)2
=
∂2(a−δU(x+ y) + b1λ−1j )
∂(λj)2
, (A.3.46)
= 2b1λ−3j < 0, forλjbig enough. (A.3.47)

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A.4 Notation Summary
Symbol Support Description
Parameters
M [1,∞) the total number of makers
N [1,∞) the total number of takers
G0 [0,∞) marginal gain per trade in linear GFT setting
pim [0, 1] share of gains from trade that is captured by the
maker
pit [0, 1] share of gains from trade that is captured by the
taker
β [0,∞) technological cost parameter for each maker
γ [0,∞) technological cost parameter for each taker
r [0,∞) the risk free rate
α, σ [0,∞) the parameters of the Brownian motion
δ [0, 1) ∪ (1,∞) the representative taker’s relative risk aversion.
States of nature
X0(t) [0,∞) the price trajectory of the riskless asset accumulation
X1(t) [0,∞) the price trajectory of the stock price
B(t) [0,∞) Geometric Brownian Motion serving as control pro-
cess of S(t).
P (t) [0,∞) representative taker’s Poisson process recording
transactions
Indices
i {1, 2, ..,M)} maker i
j {1, 2, .., N)} taker j
t {0, ..,∞} time
sn {1, 2, ..,∞} representative taker’s trading time
Decision variables
µi [0,∞) the intensity parameter of maker i.
τj [0,∞) the intensity parameter of taker j.
W0(t) [0,∞) the wealth invested in the riskless asset at time t.
W1(t) [0,∞) the wealth invested in the stock at time t.
Q(t) (−∞,∞) the amount transferred from the stock to the riskless
asset at time t (when trading is possible).
C(t) [0,∞) the amount of consumption at time t.
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Appendix B
Asset risk and bank runs
B.1 Auxiliary lemmas and proofs
In this section of the Appendix, we first present technical, auxiliary lemmas (with
proofs) that help in proving the main results of the paper, but add little intuition.
Next, we provide the proofs of the main results of the paper.
B.1.1 Auxiliary lemmas
The following lemmas are of purely technical purpose. All the properties of the
functions of µ defined below are valid on the interval
(
lr2
r1
− 1,+∞
)
unless otherwise
specified.
Lemma 12 Function
f(µ) = (µ+ 1) log
(
(µ+ 1)r1
(µ+ 1)r1 − lr2
)
(B.1.1)
is strictly decreasing for µ ∈
(
lr2
r1
− 1,+∞
)
, and
f(µ) > lr2
r1
(B.1.2)
Proof. We first determine the monotonicity of f(µ):
The derivative of f is given by:
f ′(µ) =
(µ+ 1)r1 log
(
(µ+1)r1
(µ+1)r1−lr2
)
− lr2
(
log
(
(µ+1)r1
(µ+1)r1−lr2
)
+ 1
)
(µ+ 1)r1 − lr2 (B.1.3)
The sign of f ′ is not obvious, so we determine its sign by analyzing instead the
second derivative which has a simpler form:
f ′′(µ) = l
2r22
(µ+ 1)
(
(µ+ 1)r1 − lr2
)
2 > 0. (B.1.4)
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Therefore, f ′(µ) is itself monotonically increasing on ( r2r1 l − 1,+∞).
Next, we find the limiting values of f ′1:
f ′(µ)
µ→
(
r2
r1
l−1
)+
−−−−−−−−−→ −∞ (B.1.5)
f ′(µ) µ→+∞−−−−−→ 0. (B.1.6)
Due to the monotonicity of f ′(µ) on
(
r2
r1
l − 1,+∞
)
, we conclude that f ′(µ) < 0
for any µ on the interval
(
r2
r1
l − 1,+∞
)
, that is, f strictly decreases on this interval.
Given the monotonicity of f , the range of values of f(µ) can be found by deter-
mining the limiting values of f on the interval of interest.
f(µ)
µ→( r2r1 l−1)
+
−−−−−−−−→ +∞ (B.1.7)
f(µ) µ→+∞−−−−−→ lr2
r1
(B.1.8)
Thus f(µ) > lr2r1 on the interval
(
r2
r1
l − 1,+∞
)
.

Lemma 13 The function
h(µ) = −(µ+ 1)r1 log
(
(µ+ 1)r1
(µ+ 1)r1 − lr2
)
+ lr2
(
log
(
(µ+ 1)r1
(µ+ 1)r1 − lr2
)
+ 1
)
(B.1.9)
is strictly decreasing on
(
lr2
r1
− 1,+∞
)
, and
0 < h(µ) ≤ lr2 (B.1.10)
Proof.
1In this paper, we use notation a(x)
x+0−−→ to denote the “right limit” of a(x) at x0. In other
words, it is the value of a(x), when x approaches x0 from the right on the number axis. Similarly,
we use a(x)
x−0−−→ to denote the “left limit”. “Left limit” is not the same as the “right limit”, if
function a(x) is discontinuous at x = x0. In this paper, however, when we find the left or right limit
because it’s easier and sufficient for our proof. We do not imply that the function is discontinuous
at that point.
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For h:
h′(µ) = lr2 − r1f(µ)
µ+ 1 < 0, (B.1.11)
which is a consequence of the range of f(µ) that was proved in (B.1.2).
Given the monotonicity of h, the range of its values can be found by determining
its extreme values on the interval of interest.
h(µ)
µ→( r2r1 l−1)
+
−−−−−−−−→ lr2 (B.1.12)
µ→+∞−−−−−→ 0 (B.1.13)

Lemma 14 For µ ∈
(
lr2
r1
− 1,+∞
)
, function z(µ, e) strictly increases in µ and e.
Furthermore, for µ ∈
(
µ,+∞
)
and e ∈
(
λr1
l + 1,
r1
l + 1
)
, we have that:
0 < z(µ, e) < (1− λ) lr2 (B.1.14)
Proof.
We first differentiate z w.r.t. µ to obtain
∂z
∂µ
(B.1.15)
=
(
r1 − l(e+ 1)
)(−(µ+ 1)r1 log ( (µ+1)r1(µ+1)r1−lr2)+ lr2(log ( (µ+1)r1(µ+1)r1−lr2)+ 1)
)
(µ+ 1)r1 − lr2 ,
=
(
r1 − l(e+ 1)
)
h(µ)
(µ+ 1)r1 − lr2 > 0. (B.1.16)
Next, we differentiate z with respect to e to obtain.
∂z
∂e
= lf(µ) > 0 (B.1.17)
Given the monotonicity in µ, to show that z(µ, e) > 0, it suffice to show that its
value is positive at its lower bound. In the following derivation we show that it is
indeed the case.
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z(µ, e|µ = µ) (B.1.18)
=
(1− λ)lr2
(
l(e+ 1)
(
log
(
(1−λ)r1
r1−l(e+1)
)
+ 1
)
− r1
(
λ+ log
(
(1−λ)r1
r1−l(e+1)
)))
le+ l − λr1
sign= (l(e+ 1)− r1) log
(
(1− λ)r1
r1 − l(e+ 1)
)
+ l(e+ 1)− r1λ
> (l(e+ 1)− r1)
(
(1− λ)r1
r1 − l(e+ 1) − 1
)
+ l(e+ 1)− r1λ
= 0 (B.1.19)
To prove that z(µ, e) < (1− λ) lr2, we have shown in (B.1.17) that z is increasing
in e. Now we show that the value of z at the upper bound of e is (1− λ) lr2.
z(µ, e)
e→( r1l −1)−−−−−−−−−→ (1− λ)lr2 (B.1.20)

Lemma 15 (1− λ)h(µ) < z(e, µ), for µ ∈
(
µ, 1
)
,
Proof.
The relative magnitude of (1−λ)h(µ) and z(e, µ) can be shown by the facts that
z(e, µ)− (1− λ)h(µ) increases in µ and that the differential is 0 at the lower bound
of µ.
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First, we determine the sign of ∂(z(µ)−(1−λ)h(µ))∂µ :
∂
(
z(µ)− (1− λ)h(µ))
∂µ
=
−l2r2
(
(e+ 1)
(
f(µ) + µ+ 1
)− (1− λ)r2)− λr21(µ+ 1)f(µ)
(µ+ 1)
(
(µ+ 1)r1 − lr2
)
+
lr1
(
λr2
(
f(µ) + µ+ 1
)
+ (e+ 1)(µ+ 1)f(µ)
)
(µ+ 1)
(
(µ+ 1)r1 − lr2
)
=
f(µ)
(
(µ+ 1)r1 − lr2
) (
l(e+ 1)− λr1
)
+ (1− λ)l2r22 − l(µ+ 1)r2
(
l(e+ 1)− λr1
)
(µ+ 1)
(
(µ+ 1)r1 − lr2
)
then by f(µ) > lr2
r1
, which is a result proved in Lemma 12, the above derivative is:
>
lr2
r1
(
(µ+ 1)r1 − lr2
) (
l(e+ 1)− λr1
)
+ (1− λ)l2r22 − l(µ+ 1)r2
(
l(e+ 1)− λr1
)
(µ+ 1)
(
(µ+ 1)r1 − lr2
)
= l
2r22 (r1 − le− l)
(µ+ 1)r1
(
(µ+ 1)r1 − lr2
)
>0 (B.1.21)
Now we show that the value of the differential is 0 at the lower bound of µ, which
concludes the proof.
z(e, µ)− (1− λ)h(µ) µ=µ= 0 (B.1.22)

Lemma 16 For e ∈
(
λr1
l − 1, r1l − 1
)
, function k(e) strictly increases, and
0 < λ(1− λ)r1 < −λr1 log(λ) < k(e) < (1− λ)r1 (B.1.23)
Proof.
For e ∈
(
λr1
l − 1, r1l − 1
)
, differentiating k, yields
k′(e) = −l log
(
l(e+ 1)
r1
)
> 0 (B.1.24)
Given the monotonicity of k, the range of values of k(e) can be found by deter-
mining the extreme values of k on the boundaries of the support.
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k(e)
e→(λr1l −1)+−−−−−−−−→ −λr1 log(λ) > 0 (B.1.25)
k(e)
e→( r1l −1)−−−−−−−−−→ (1− λ)r1 > 0 (B.1.26)

Proposition 4:
Proof.
Our proof has three stages. First, we assume equilibrium threshold strategies
and derive the optimal common threshold. Next, we show that there is only one
such threshold, proving uniqueness. Finally, we prove that given this unique optimal
threshold, it is individually optimal to engage in these threshold strategies.
Consider a patient depositor that has her signal equalling θi. Then her expected
utility differential defined by formula (3.11) should be a function of the behavior of
other patient depositors represented by the common threshold θ′ and should have
the following form:
∆(θi, θ′) ≡ E
(
v(θ, n(θ, θ′))|θi
)
= 12
∫ θi+
θ=θi−
1
µ
v(θ, n(θ, θ′))dθ, (B.1.27)
where 1µ is the probability density function of θ, which is uniformly distributed on
interval [1− µ, 1].
Since depositor i would roll over if her signal is above θ′ and withdraw if below,
then if her signal is θ′, she should be indifferent between withdrawal and rollover,
that is:
∆(θ′, θ′) = 0 (B.1.28)
. ∆(θ′, θ′) can be considered a function of θ′ ∈ [0, 1]. For equilibrium existence, we
need to prove that there is a θ′ such that (B.1.28) holds.
With the assumption of the existence of upper dominance region and lower dom-
inance region, we can show that there is θ′ low enough such that ∆(θ′, θ′) < 0 and it
high enough such that ∆(θ′, θ′) > 0. The existence of lower dominance region means
that when the state is so slow that θ ≤ θ, the signal of all depositors are as a result
low enough such that, no matter what the shared threshold θ′ is, they would run.
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That is: ∆(θi, θ′) < 0; and naturally for θ′ ≤ θ, we have: ∆(θ′, θ′) < 0. Using the
similar argument, assuming the upper dominance region exist, we have: for θ′ ≥ θ¯,
we have: ∆(θ′, θ′) > 0.
Then to prove the existence of an equilibrium it suffices to show that ∆(θ′, θ′) is
continuous in θ′. This is indeed the case as the integrand 1µv(θ, n(θ, θ′)) is bounded.
v(θ, n(θ, θ′)) is discontinuous at θ¯, but the continuity of the integrand is not necessary
for the proof of the continuity of the integral as the discontinuity of the integrand is
smoothed out by integration.
Furthermore, to show that there is only one symmetric threshold equilibrium, we
only need to show that ∆(θ′, θ′) is increasing in θ′. This is indeed the case because
when both the private signal and the threshold strategy increase by the same amount,
the depositor’s expectation of the withdrawal proportion of the entire depositor base
n is unchanged, while the chance of paying off for waiting is higher. From here on,
we write the θ′ that satisfies the fix point condition above θ∗, which is a candidate
of the equilibrium threshold.
Lastly, we show that θ∗ is indeed an equilibrium. To this end, we need to show
that for any θi < θ∗, ∆(θi, θ∗) < 02, and for any θi > θ∗, ∆(θi, θ∗) > 0. To show
this, we first prove that function v(θ, n(θ, θ∗)) crosses 0 only once:
Claim 1 There is only one θ03 such that v(θ0, n(θ0, θ∗)) = 0. Furthermore, for any
θ < θ0, v(θ, n(θ, θ∗)) < 0 and for any θ > θ0, v(θ, n(θ, θ∗)) > 0.
Proof of Claim 1.1 As can be seen from the formula (3.10), v(θ, n(θ, θ∗)) > 0, if
λ ≤ n(θ) ≤ n˜; and v(θ, n(θ, θ∗)) < 0, if n˙ ≤ n(θ) ≤ 1. So it suffice to show that
v(θ, n(θ, θ∗)) > 0 is monotonic when n˜ < n(θ) < n˙. This is indeed the case by
taking derivative with respect to θ for θ
(1+µ)
(
e+1−n(θ)r1l
)
(1−n(θ)) − r1, applying chain rule
and obtaining ∂n(θ)∂θ by taking derivative for formula (3.15).
Then compared with the value of ∆(θ∗, θ∗), for any θ < θ∗, the probability
is shifted from the positive values of v to the negative values of v. As a result,
∆(θ, θ∗) < ∆(θ∗, θ∗), since we’ve shown above that ∆(θ∗, θ∗) = 0, we conclude:
∆(θ, θ∗) < 0, for any θ < θ∗. A symmetric argument can be made for: ∆(θ, θ∗) > 0,
for any θ > θ∗. This concludes the entire proof.

Lemma 7
2Note that this is not implied by what we have proved above: for any θ′ < θ∗, ∆(θ′, θ′) < 0.
3As the root of v, θ0 is usually different in value from θ∗, which is the root of the expected value
of v.
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Proof.
θ∗ is defined by the indifference condition (B.1.28) when evaluated in θ∗. This
means that for any depositor i, when all other depositors adopt θ∗ as the with-
draw threshold, and when depositor i happens to receive a signal at θ∗, then she is
indifferent between withdrawing and waiting. To write this in full:
∆(θ∗, θ∗) = 12
∫ θ∗+
θ=θ∗−
1
µ
v(θ, n(θ, θ∗))dθ
(plug in values and bounds in Table 3.1:)
= 12
∫ θ˜
θ∗−
1
µ
(
0− (e+ 1)l
n(θ, θ∗)
)
dθ
+ 12
∫ θ˙
θ˜
1
µ
θ (1 + µ)
(
e+ 1− n(θ,θ∗)r1l
)
(1− n(θ, θ∗)) − r1
 dθ
+ 12
∫ θ∗+
θ˙
1
µ
(θr2 − r1) dθ
= 0 (B.1.29)
Based on the relationship between n and θ defined in formula (3.15), changing
measure from θ to n, equation (B.1.29) can alternatively be written as:
∆(θ∗, θ∗) =
∫ 1
n˙
(
0− (e+ 1)l
n
)
dn
+
∫ n˙
n˜
(
θ
(1 + µ)
(
e+ 1− nr1l
)
(1− n) − r1
)
dn
+
∫ n˜
λ
(θr2 − r1) dn
=0 (B.1.30)
Similar with the solution strategy in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), to simplify
this formula further so we can pull θ out of the integrals in the second and third term
in equation (B.1.30), we now show that θ is approximately constant and equal to θ∗
for n ∈ [λ, n˙].
First, we express θ as a function of n. Reversely from formula (3.15), given a
threshold θ∗ common to all depositors, for a fraction of withdrawers n ∈ (λ, 1), the
Appendix B. Asset risk and bank runs 65
realized state θ that led to this fraction must be:
θ = θ∗ + 
(
1− 2n− 2λ1− λ
)
(B.1.31)
We can see that θ converges to θ∗ for n ∈ [λ, n˙].
Then similar to Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), taking limit with respect to → 0
for both sides of equation (B.1.30), we get:4
lim
→0
∆(θ∗, θ∗) =
∫ 1
n˙
(
0− (e+ 1)l
n
)
dn
+
∫ n˙
n˜
(
θ∗
(1 + µ)
(
e+ 1− nr1l
)
(1− n) − r1
)
dn
+
∫ n˜
λ
(θ∗r2 − r1) dn
=0 (B.1.32)
Solving for θ∗, we obtain:
lim
→0
θ∗ =
∫ 1
n˙
(e+1)l
n dn+
∫ n˙
n˜
r1dn+
∫ n˜
λ
r1dn∫ n˙
n˜
[
(1+µ)(e+1−nr1l )
(1−n)
]
dn+
∫ n˜
λ
r2dn
(Making integration of simple functions 1
n
, 11− n and 1, and plugging in
(B.1.33)
formula (3.5) of n˙ and formula (3.7) of n˜:)
= −
l
(
l(e+ 1)
(
log
(
r1
l(e+1)
)
+ 1
)
− λr1
)
((
r1 − l(e+ 1)
)
(µ+ 1) log
(
(µ+1)r1
(µ+1)r1−lr2
)
− (1− λ)lr2
)
(For the ease of notation, replacing blocks of expressions with function k(e)
based on formula (3.17) and with function z(µ, e) based on (3.18):)
= lk(e)
z(e, µ) (B.1.34)
4In this paper, limcondition and
condition−−−−−−→ are used interchangeably.
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
Lemma 8
Proof. Since bankruptcy probability is intimately linked with the bankruptcy
threshold of the state θ, we first compute the thresholds for period 1 and period
2 bankruptcy, respectively.
Period 1 bankruptcy is triggered when there are n˙ ≡ (e+1)lr1 (from condition (3.5)
mass of depositors withdrawing. The quantity of withdrawers in period 1 depends on
the realized state θ, since the depositors decide whether to withdraw based on their
signals of θi = θ + i. In proving Lemma 7, we derived the formula (B.1.31) of θ as
a function of n. This allows us to pin down the threshold θ˙ by plugging the formula
of n˙ into formula (B.1.31):
θ˙ = θ∗ + 
(
1− 2n˙− 2λ1− λ
)
= θ∗ + 
1− 2 (e+1)lr1 − 2λ1− λ
 (B.1.35)
Similarly, since n˜ is the critical mass for period 2 bankruptcy, we can plug its
formula as in (3.7) into formula (B.1.31) to obtain the bankruptcy threshold of period
2:
θ˜ = θ∗ + 
(
1− 2n˜− 2λ1− λ
)
= θ∗ + 
1− 2 (1+µ)(e+1)−r2(1+µ)r1l −r2 − 2λ1− λ
 (B.1.36)
Now we can see that:
lim
→0
θ˙ = lim
→0
θ˜ = θ∗ (B.1.37)
In other words, θ is approximately always equal to θ∗ in the interval n ∈ [n˜, n˙].
Since θ is uniformly distributed on [1 − µ, 1], the probability pi1 of period 1
bankruptcy can be expressed as a function of θ˙ as follows:
pi1 = prob(θ ≤ θ˙) = θ˙ − (1− µ)
µ
, (B.1.38)
Similarly, period 2 bankruptcy probability pi2 can be written as:
Appendix B. Asset risk and bank runs 67
pi2 = prob(θ ≤ θ˜) = θ˜ − (1− µ)
µ
(B.1.39)
Then by equation (B.1.37), we have that the two probabilities converge:
lim
→0
pi1 = lim
→0
pi2
=θ
∗ − (1− µ)
µ
→0−−−→
lk(e)
z(e,µ) − 1 + µ
µ
≡ pi, (B.1.40)
where we use Lemma 7 for the last step. 
Proposition 5
Proof.
As  → 0, run probability pi has the formula as in (3.19) due to Lemma 8.
Therefore, we have that
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∂pi
∂e
→0−−−→ ∂
∂e
θ∗ − 1 + µ
µ
= 1
µ
∂θ∗
∂e
=
l2
((λ− log ( r1l(1+e))) r1 − (1 + e)l
)
f(µ) + (1− λ)lr2 log
(
r1
l(1+e)
)
µz(µ)2
sign=
(λ− log( r1
l(1 + e)
))
r1 − (1 + e)l
 f(µ) + (1− λ)lr2 log( r1
l(1 + e)
)
(Using f(µ) > lr2
r1
from Lemma 12, and the coefficient of f(x) being negative
because λr1 < (1 + e)l from assumption (3.8):)
<
(
λ− log
(
r1
l(1 + e)
))
lr2 − (1 + e) l
2r2
r1
+ (1− λ)lr2 log
(
r1
l(1 + e)
)
= λlr2 − (1 + e) l
2r2
r1
− λlr2 log
(
r1
l(1 + e)
)
(Using a property of logarithm: log(x) > 1− 1
x
for x > 0)
< λlr2 − (1 + e) l
2r2
r1
− λlr2
(
1− l(1 + e)
r1
)
= −(1 + e) l
2r2
r1
+ λl
2r2(1 + e)
r1
< 0 (B.1.41)
where f(µ) is defined as in Lemma 12.

Lemma 9
Proof. Taking derivative with respect to µ for θ∗ as in formula (3.16):
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∂
∂µ
θ∗(µ) = −
l
(
r1 − (e+ 1)l
)
h(µ)
(
(e+ 1)l
(
1 + log
(
r1
(e+1)l
))
− λr1
)
(
(µ+ 1)r1 − lr2
) (
(r1 − l(e+ 1))f(µ)− l(1− λ)r2
)2
Here we replace blocks of expressions with functions k, h and z
defined in Lemmas 16, 13 and 14, respectively:
= − l
(
r1 − l(e+ 1)
)
k(e)h(µ)(
(µ+ 1)r1 − lr2
) (
z(e, µ)
)2 (B.1.42)
< 0, (B.1.43)
where r1− l(e+1) > 0 is implied by (3.2); (µ+1)r1− lr2 > 0 since 1+µ > r2 and
r1 > l by assumption, and the signs of functions k, h and z are proved in Lemma 16,
Lemma 13 and Lemma 14 respectively. 
Proposition 6
Proof. As → 0, run probability pi has the formula as in (3.19).
First, we show that ∂∂e
∂pi
∂µ > 0, so that the task of proof is reduced to finding any
interior point of e for which ∂pi∂µ < 0, then any e below that point gives rise to
∂pi
∂µ < 0.
Finally, we determine a loose upper bound of e that makes this happen.
Lemma 17 For any combinations of parameters within their support,
∂
∂e
∂pi
∂µ
> 0 (B.1.44)
Proof. We have that
∂
∂e
∂pi
∂µ
= µ ∂
∂e
dθ∗(µ)
dµ − θ∗(µ) + 1
µ2
sign= µ ∂
∂e
dθ∗(µ)
dµ −
∂
∂e
θ∗(µ). (B.1.45)
Next, we derive expressions for the two terms separately. To obtain the derivative
of the first term with respect to e, we take derivative of dθ
∗(µ)
dµ from (B.1.42) with
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respect to e:
µ
∂
∂e
dθ∗(µ)
dµ
=− µ ∂
∂e
l
(
r1 − (e+ 1)l
)
h(µ)k(e)(
(µ+ 1)r1 − lr2
)
z(e, µ)2
=µ
l2
(
r1 − (e+ 1)l
)
h(µ)
(
2k(e)f(µ)− log
(
r1
l(1+e)
)
z(e, µ)
)
(
(µ+ 1)r1 − lr2
)
z(e, µ)3
(B.1.46)
r1 − l(e + 1) > 0 is implied by (3.2); (µ + 1)r1 − lr2 > 0 since 1 + µ > r2 and
r1 > l by assumption; and the signs of functions h and z are proved in Lemma 13 and
Lemma 16 respectively, thus to show the above formula positive, it suffice to show:
(
2k(e)f(µ)− log
(
r1
l(1 + e)
)
z(e, µ)
)
> 0 (B.1.47)
And condition (B.1.47) holds because:
k(e)f(µ)− log
(
r1
l(1 + e)
)
z(e, µ)
=
l(e+ 1)(1 + log( r1
l(e+ 1)
))
− λr1
 f(µ)
− log
(
r1
l(e+ 1)
)(
− (r1 − l(e+ 1)) f(µ) + (1− λ)lr2)
=
(
l(e+ 1)− λr1
)
f(µ) + l(e+ 1) log
(
r1
l(e+ 1)
)
f(µ)
− l(e+ 1) log
(
r1
l(e+ 1)
)
f(µ) + log
(
r1
l(1 + e)
)(
r1f(µ)− (1− λ)lr2
)
(By Lemma 12:)
>
(
l(e+ 1)− λr1
)
f(µ) + log
(
r1
l(1 + e)
)(
r1
r2
r1
l − (1− λ)lr2
)
=
(
l(e+ 1)− λr1
)
f(µ) + log
(
r1
l(1 + e)
)
λlr2
>0 (B.1.48)
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Now to prove the lemma, we only need to show that the second term in for-
mula (B.1.45) is also positive, that is: ∂∂eθ∗(µ) < 0. This is the case because:
∂
∂e
θ∗(µ) = ∂
∂e
lk(e)
z(e, µ)
= l
2
z(e, µ)3
z(e, µ)(k(e)f(µ)− log( r1
l(1 + e)
)
z(e, µ)
)
+ k(e)µh(µ)z(e, µ)(1 + µ)r1 − lr2

(B.1.49)
similar to the arguments made for the derivative of the first term, k(e), h(µ), z(e, µ)
and (1 + µ)r1 − lr2 are all positive. Thus to show the above formula positive, it also
suffices to show (B.1.47), which we have already proved. This concludes the entire
proof.

Now after proving Lemma 17, it remains to be shown that there is at least one e0
within the support of e restricted by the assumptions made so far in this paper, such
that when e = e0, pi∂µ < 0. Then by Lemma 17, holding other parameters constant,
for any e ∈
(
λr1
l − 1, e0
)
, we also have pi∂µ < 0. We show that such an e0 exists by
giving a numeric example:
It can be checked that, when r1 = 1.5, r2 = 1.55, l = 0.7, λ = 0.5, e = 0.5, µ =
0.9, not only is e < e¯(µ) satisfied, but also all the assumptions we’ve made so far:
(3.2),(3.8), (3.9) and (3.13).
This numerical result also proves the existence for µ > 12 , the societal optimal. 
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B.2 Notation Summary
Symbol Support Description
Parameters
e [0,∞) the equity amount of the bank
ρ ≡ 11+e (0, 1) the leverage of the bank
l [0, 1) liquidation value of the asset
r1 (1, r2) the return to the depositor if withdraw in period
1
r2 (r1, 1 + µ) the return to the depositor if wait until period 2
µ [ r1r2 − 2, 1] asset risk
1− µ [0, 1− r1r2 + 2] upside payoff of the asset
λ [0, 1] fraction of impatient depositors
Indices
i [0, 1] depositors
t {0, 1, 2} time periods
States of nature
θ [1− µ, 1] asset success probability
i [−, ] the noise of depositor i’s signal of θ
θi [1− µ− , 1 + ] the noisy signal of θ for depositor i.
Decision variables
n [λ, 1] the fraction of depositors that withdraw
n˙ [λ, 1] smallest n to trigger t = 1 bankruptcy
n˜ [λ, 1] smallest n to trigger t = 2 bankruptcy
v() [−1, 1] utility differential between rollover and withdraw
∆(θi) [−1, 1] expected value of v() given θi.
θ∗ [1− µ, 1] run threshold
θ¯ {1− 3} upper dominance bound
θ { r1r2 } lower dominance bound
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C.1 Figures
Figure C.1. Diagram of governance horizon
Usually corporate governance is interpreted as a mapping from the observable
value change of a firm to rewards or punishments to be delivered to the
management. “Governance horizon” (a.k.a. results evaluation horizon) is an
implicit parameter of this mapping because an evaluation horizon needs to be
specified for the computation of the change of the observable firm value . The
curve in this diagram represents the exploration-exploitation stages of the
innovation process. Short term governance horizon would result in the delivery of
punishment due to the lack of short term return for the exploration.
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time
V2014
V2011
V2012
2011 2012 2014
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Figure C.2. Truncation problems of patent data - cause
This figure illustrates the cause of truncation problems. The solid boxes and solid
arrowhead represent the information available in the patent database, and the dashed
boxes and dashed arrowheads represent information only available from the application
data. Each arrowhead represents one source of citations. For example, arrowhead B
represents the citations made to pre-grant applications from granted patents. The
patent data does not allow researchers to count applications for the patent count
measure. This is the first type of truncation problem. It does not allow researchers to
count sources B, C and D for the citation count measure. This is the second type of
truncation problem.
patent patent
patent
application
patent
application
A
B
C
D
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Figure C.3. Truncation problems of patent data - accuracy
This figure illustrates how truncation problems with patent data cause biases of the raw
measures for evaluating recent innovations. In both panels, the x-axis represents the
year the patent applications were filed. For the left panel, the y-axis represents the
number of patents applied in year x that is granted as of 2016 (the black dots), or as of
2006 (the red dots). For the right panel, the y-axis represents the number of citations
received by the patents that were filed in year x, and granted as of 2016 (the black
dots), or as of 2006 (the red dots). Measures constructed after a ten year wait period
suffers little from truncation problems, as most applications in figure C.2 are either
granted patent status, or are effectively dormant at that point.(Lerner and Seru (2015))
Thus, the black dots represent the benchmark to which short term measures compete to
estimate. Therefore the vertical gap between black dots and red dots represent how
much the amount of bias in the raw measure. The figure demonstrates that the bias is
substantial for recent innovations (from the perspective of a researcher in 2006), and
the bias increases as year x approaches 2006. The detailed procedure of the
computation of the raw measure is described in section 4.2
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Figure C.4. Truncation problems solved by adding patent application data -
accuracy
This figure illustrates how the truncation problem can be solved by including patent
application data. The x, y axes, black dots and red dots are defined the same as figure
C.3. In both panels, the green dots represent the two measures computed using both
patent and application data1 with the data available as of 2006 (called the
“supplemented measures”). The vertical gap between each 2006 measure (red and
green) and the benchmark represent how biased each measure is for patents filed in year
x.
Panel A. C: Log patent count
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Table C.1. Truncation problems solved by adding patent application data -
precision
This table quantifies and contrasts the precision of the raw and supplemented measures
by their Pearson correlations with the benchmark measure. p-value is reported in the
parenthesis.
Measure Correlation with the benchmark
Patent count
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Suppl. 0.9944(0.00) 0.9888(0.00) 0.9948 (0.00) 0.9965(0.00) 0.9956(0.00) 0.9947(0.00)
Raw 0.9898(0.00) 0.9709(0.00) 0.9434 (0.00) 0.9051 (0.00) 0.8201 (0.00) 0.6765(0.00)
Average normalized citation count per patent
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Suppl. 0.8646(0.00) 0.7718(0.00) 0.7304 (0.00) 0.6654 (0.00) 0.6155 (0.00) 0.5758 (0.00)
Raw 0.4533(0.02) 0.3048(0.02) 0.1625 (0.02) 0.0427 (0.08) 0.0046 (0.85) 0.0108 (0.68)
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Table C.2. Summary statistics
This table reports the summary statistics for variables constructed based on the sample
of U.S. public firms from 2011 to 2015. Panel A reports the summary statistics of
innovation measures. Panel B reports the summary statistics of the percentage of votes
that are for “once every three years”. Panel C presents the year distribution of SOP
freq. voting. Panel D reports the industry distribution of firms with shareholder
proposals. Panel E reports the summary statistics of firm characteristics that have
shown to affect innovations.
Panel A: Innovation measures
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. N
Log Pat. Count 2.399 2.079 1.933 1292
Log Cit. Count 4.451 4.304 2.269 1041
Exploi. Index 0.402 0.401 0.228 1094
Cit. diversity 0.247 0.248 0.165 1094
Panel B: Percentage of Votes that are for “once every three years”
Variable Mean 25th Median 75th Passage
Rate
N
All SOP freq. votes 31.2% 7.3% 15.6% 54.3% 28.3% 4,884
Those filed patents 29.2% 7.7% 14.7% 48.2% 27.2% 2,247
Close-call SOP freq votes 47.5% 44.1% 49.7% 55.1% 51.5% 249
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Panel C: Year Distribution of Shareholder Proposal Voting
Year All SOP freq. votes Those filedpatents
Close-call
SOP freq votes
Ave. firm size
Mil.$
2011 3,328 1,673 162 1665
2012 13 8 1 660
2013 929 340 71 181
2014 272 85 9 424
2015 204 75 9 440
2016 138 64 4 NA
Total 4,884 2,247 249 1271
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Panel D: Industry distribution of firms that voted on SOP frequency
SIC Description All proposals ATP-relatedProposals
Close-call ATP
Proposals
0 Agriculture 11 5 1
1 Mining 266 55 3
2 Light manufacturing 668 458 73
3 Heavy manufacturing 976 781 91
4 Transportation 326 115 10
5 Wholesale trade 342 102 4
6 Finance 1,016 148 10
7 Services 489 272 23
8 Health services 162 64 13
9 Public Administration 15 7 3
Panel E: Distribution of firm characteristics
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev.
Assets (Mil. $) 13162 649.64 93329 1577
R&D/Assets (%) 0.129 0.066 0.204 1258
PPE/Assets (%) 0.170 0.114 0.173 1574
Leverage 0.156 0.086 0.261 1569
CapEx/Assets (%) 0.034 0.023 0.039 1574
Industry Herf. 0.242 0.181 0.190 1579
Tobin’s Q 2.962 1.779 8.441 1568
ROA 0.017 0.106 0.345 1589
KZ Index 6.604 -0.120 198.059 1546
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Figure C.5. Internal validity - manipulation - density of vote shares
This figure plots the histogram of the distribution of the percentage of votes for “once
every three years” SOP in our sample across 40 equally-spaced bins. The x-axis is the
percentage of votes favoring a “once every three years” SOP frequency. The y-axis
represents the fraction of firms whose shareholders votes in favor of this. Votes for
“once every two years” are not counted. SOP frequency voting results are obtained
from the ISS.
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Figure C.6. Internal validity - manipulation - McCrary test
This figure reports the result of the McCrary test (McCrary (2008)) of discontinuity of
vote share density at 50%. The x-axis represents the percentage of votes favoring “once
every three years” SOP. The y-axis represents the density estimate. The dots depict the
density estimate, and the solid line represents the fitted density function of the x (the
vote share) with a 95% confidence interval around the fitted line. The votes in favor of
“once every two years” are not counted. SOP frequency voting results are obtained
from the ISS.
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Figure C.7. Internal validity - implementation of voting results
This figure plots the implementation of the SOP frequency voting results. The x-axis is
the percentage of votes favoring “once every three years” SOP. The y-axis is the SOP
frequency implemented, where “1” represents “once per year” and “3” represents “once
every three years”. Each dot represents the SOP frequency voting of one firm in my
sample. The votes in favor of “once every two years” are not counted. SOP frequency
voting results are obtained from the ISS. Implementation data is collected by ISS from
SEC 8-K filings.
1
3
Im
pl
im
en
te
d 
SO
P 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 .25 .5 .75 1
% Votes For Once Every Three Years
Appendix C. CEO evaluation frequencies and innovation 85
Table C.3. Balance checks - absence of discontinuity of firm characteristics
This table supports the validity of the RDD design by showing that ex ante (year 2010)
values of firm characteristics do not have discontinuities around the 50% vote share.
The variables are defined in the same way as Chemmanur and Tian (2018). I use local
polynomial with local correctional term with an optimal bandwidth to estimate the
discontinuous jump in the ex-ante outcome, following Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012). Standard errors are presented in brackets. */**/*** indicates significant at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Assets (Mil$) R&D/Assets PPE/Assets
β -1324.5 -0.014 0.003
[3622.3] [0.114] [0.041]
Obs 2308 1683 2298
Leverage CAPX/Assets Industry HHI
β 0.013 0.001 0.031
[0.037] [0.008] [0.049]
Obs 2298 2305 2313
Tobin’s Q ROA KZ Index
β -1.535 -0.034 -25.8
[1.802] [0.104] [26.1]
Obs 2298 2336 2243
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Figure C.8. Balance checks - absence of discontinuity of firm characteristics - RD
plots
This figure is the RD plot generated using the variables described in table C.3.
The x axis represents vote shares in favor of “once every three years”. The y axis
represents the density of each vote share. Each dot represents the density
averaged over a 0.25% bin. The interval around it is the 95% confidence interval
of the mean. The curve is the fitted 4th order polynomial on either side of the
cutoff. The lack of significant discontinuity demonstrated by the fact that the
fitted line is still within the confidence interval of the bin estimate of the
opposite side.
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Table C.4. Balance checks - absence of discontinuity of ex ante innovation
measures
This table supports the validity of the RDD design by showing that ex ante (year 2010)
values of innovation measures do not have discontinuities around the 50% vote share. I
use local polynomial with local correctional term with an optimal bandwidth to
estimate the discontinuous jump in the ex-ante outcome, following Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012). Standard errors are presented in brackets. */**/*** indicates
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Log Pat. Count Log Cit. Count Exploi. Index Cite Divers.
β 0.640 0.799 -0.095 0.009
[0.412] [0.567] [0.071] [0.040]
Obs 1073 936 946 946
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Figure C.9. Balance checks - absence of discontinuity of ex ante innovation
measures - RD plots
This figure is the RD plot generated using the variables described in table C.4.
The x axis represents vote shares in favor of “once every three years”. The y axis
represents the density of each vote share. Each dot represents the density
averaged over a 0.25% bin. The interval around it is the 95% confidence interval
of the mean. The curve is the fitted 4th order polynomial on either side of the
cutoff. The lack of significant discontinuity demonstrated by the fact that the
fitted line is still within the confidence interval of the bin estimate of the
opposite side.2
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Table C.5. Dynamics of log patent count
This table is generated following the same RD protocol as Table C.3. The measure
tested is the log patent count in the first, second and third year after the SOP
frequency vote and SOP vote.
Log Patent Count
first year second year third year
β 0.550 0.701 1.333**
[0.447] [0.591] [0.528]
Obs 1043 1007 880
Figure C.10. Dynamics of log patent count
This figure is the RD plot generated using the variables described in table C.5.
The x axis represents vote shares in favor of “once every three years”. The y-axis
represents the number of patents that are filed in the first, second and third year
after the SOP frequency vote and SOP vote.
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Table C.6. Dynamics of citation count
This table is generated following the same RD measure as table C.3. The measure used
is the citation count for patents that are filed in the first, second and third year after
the SOP frequency vote and SOP vote.
Log Count of Citations Received
first year second year third year
β 0.508 -0.067 0.934*
[.791] [0.832] [0.573]
Obs 848 792 635
Figure C.11. Dynamics of citation count
This figure is the RD plot generated using the variables described in table C.6.
The x axis represents vote shares in favor of “once every three years”. The y-axis
represents the citation count for patents that are filed in the first, second and
third year after the SOP frequency vote and SOP vote.
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Table C.7. Exploration-exploitation dynamics: Exploitation Index
This figure is the RD plot generated using the protocol described in table C.3. The x
axis represents vote shares in favor of “once every three years”. The measure tested is
the exploitation index: ratio of the number of citations given to the same tech field by
the patents of the firm of interest, divided by the total citations that these patents give.
It measures how NOT explorative a firm is in a given year.
Exploitation Index
first year second year third year
β -0.298*** -.142 -0.002
[0.066] [0.144] [0.128]
Obs 896 832 694
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Figure C.12. Exploration-exploitation dynamics: Exploitation Index
This figure is the RD plot generated using the variables described in table C.7.
The x axis represents vote shares in favor of “once every three years”. The
measure tested is the exploitation index: ratio of the number of citations given to
the same tech field by the patents of the firm of interest, divided by the total
citations they give. It measures how NOT explorative a firm is for a given year.
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Table C.8. Exploration-exploitation dynamics: Diversity of the Citations Given
by the firm of interest
This figure is the RD plot generated using the protocol described in table C.3. The
measure tested is the (one minus) Herfendahl index of the technological fields to which
a firm’s patents give citation. It measures how explorative a firm is in a given year.
Then the same test is performed on the time series difference of this variable.
Citation tech dispersion
first year second year third year
β 0.186*** 0.116 0.018
[0.062] [0.090] [0.077]
Obs 896 832 694
Diff. of Citation tech dispersion
first year second year third year
β 0.200*** 0.005 -0.003
[0.054] [0.063] [0.070]
Obs 769 735 634
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Figure C.13. Exploration-exploitation dynamics: Diversity of the Citations
Given by the firm of interest
This figure is the RD plot generated using the variables described in table C.8.
The measure tested is the (one minus) Herfendahl index of the technological
fields to which a firm’s patents give citation. It measures how explorative a firm
is for a given year. Then the same test is performed on the time series difference
of this variable.
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Table C.9. Robustness test: fixed bandwidth (5%) for the RDD
This table is the RD results generated during the procedure described in table C.3. For
each of two measures of innovation output and the two measures of innovation strategy,
instead of using a endogenously generated dynamic bandwidth like above, a fixed
bandwidth of 5% was adopted.
Patent count
first year second year third year
β 0.480 0.938 1.321**
[0.471] [0.699] [0.632]
Obs 64 49 42
Patent count
first year second year third year
β 0.995 1.055 0.848*
[0.887] [0.919] [0.431]
Obs 49 40 35
Exploitation quotient
first year second year third year
β -0.431*** -0.508*** -0.109
[0.149] [0.165] [0.180]
Obs 53 40 39
Citation field dispersion
first year second year third year
β 0.209** 0.239** -0.061
[0.095] [0.099] [0.099]
Obs 53 40 39
Diff. of Citation tech dispersion
first year second year third year
β 0.168*** 0.082 -0.096*
[0.061] [0.062] [0.057]
Obs 41 39 35
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Table C.10. Robustness test: falsification test with cutoff set at 30%
This table is the RD results generated during the procedure described in table C.3. For
each of two measures of innovation output and the two measures of innovation strategy,
instead of setting the cutoff of the treatment and control at 50%, here we set the cutoff
at 30%, a split that is not meaningful, to check if the result is spurious.
Patent count
first year second year third year
β 0.710 1.642*** -0.247
[0.683] [0.599] [0.545]
Obs 1043 1007 880
Patent count
first year second year third year
β -0.57 0.150 -0.581
[0.824] [0.674] [0.788]
Obs 848 792 635
Exploitation quotient
first year second year third year
β -0.015 -0.038 -0.058
[0.053] [0.055] [0.066]
Obs 896 832 694
Citation field dispersion
first year second year third year
β 0.050 -0.082 -0.060
[0.056] [0.050] [0.039]
Obs 896 832 694
Diff. of Citation tech dispersion
first year second year third year
β 0.030 -0.048 0.022
[0.047] [0.059] [0.034]
Obs 769 735 634
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